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This study reconstructs the 1928–1929 correspondence between Reichenbach and Einstein about the latter’s latest distant
parallelism-unified field theory, which attracted considerable public attention at the end of the 1920s. Reichenbach, who had
recently become a Professor in Berlin, had the opportunity to discuss the theory with Einstein and therefore sent him a
manuscript with some comments for feedback. The document has been preserved among Einstein’s papers. However, the
subsequent correspondence took an unpleasant turn after Reichenbach published a popular article on distant parallelism in a
newspaper. Einstein directly wrote to the Editorial Board complaining about Reichenbach’s unfair use of off-the-record
information. While Reichenbach’s reply demonstrates a sense of personal betrayal at Einstein’s behavior, his published
writings of that period point to a sense of intellectual betrayal of their shared philosophical ideals. In his attempts to unify
both electricity and gravitation, Einstein had abandoned the physical heuristic that guided him to the relativity theory, to
embrace a more speculative, mathematical heuristic that he and Reichenbach had both previously condemned. A decade-long
personal and intellectual friendship grew fainter and then never recovered. In addition to Giovanelli, 2016a, this study,
relying on archival material, aims to revisit the Reichenbach–Einstein relationship in the late 1920s in light of Reichenbach’s
neglected contributions to the epistemology of the unified field theory program. Thus, this study hopes to provide a richer
account of Reichenbach’s philosophy of space and time.
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Introduction
According to his recollections, Einstein (1949a, 73-75) had always considered his 1915 field theory of
gravitation, the general theory of relativity, as nothing but a stepping stone toward a ‘unified field theory’,1
which would somehow integrate both gravitational and electromagnetic fields into a single field structure.
In his later years, Einstein tended to downplay his initial skepticism toward this endeavor. However, it is
undeniable that his quixotic2 quest for the final field theory spans over most of Einstein’s professional
life right from 1919 (Einstein, 1919) till his death in 1955 (Einstein and Kaufman, 1955).3 Seldom, it is
noted that Hans Reichenbach was possibly the only philosopher who, alongside his well-known work on
relativity theory, possessed the epistemological insight and mathematical knowledge to find his bearings
within the intricacies of the various unification attempts. Indeed, Reichenbach was closer to the historical
events than almost all others. He witnessed the dawn of the unified field theory program in the late 1910s
when he attended the Berlin lectures of a still cautious Einstein; and, back again in Berlin as a professor
in the late 1920s (see Hecht and Hoffmann, 1982), he observed its twilight, when Einstein had become the
increasingly isolated practitioner of a non-mainstream research program.
Although most of Reichenbach’s critical remarks on the unified field theory program appeared in
published writings, the personal and philosophical motivations of his mistrust toward the field–theoretical
undertake emerges more clearly in the letters he exchanged with some of the major figures of physics
research of those years. For a general overview, Reichenbach’s reflections on the unified field theory
1In the following, I will freely draw from the standard literature on the unified field theory program: Vizgin, 1994Goenner,
2004Goldstein and Ritter, 2003.
2The expression is used by Einstein himself on several occasions; see e.g., Einstein to Besso, Apr. 15, 1950; Speziali, 1972,
Doc. 172; Einstein to Laue, Jan. 17, 1951; EA, 16-168; Einstein to Bohm, Nov. 24, 1954; EA, 8-055; Einstein to Born; (Born
and Einstein, 1968–1971, Doc. 93, undated).
3For an overview of Einstein’s work on unified field theory program, see Sauer (2014); for the philosophical background of
Einstein’s search for a unified field theory see Dongen (2010); on Einstein’s philosophy of science Ryckman (2017).
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program can be organized around three correspondences, which, as I will explain, roughly seem to revolve
around three different conceptual issues:
(i) Reichenbach–Weyl correspondence (1920-1921)
(ii) Reichenbach–Einstein correspondence (1926-1927)
(iii) Reichenbach–Einstein correspondence (1928-1929)
The recognition of the significance of episode (i) has been an important result of the Reichenbach
scholarship of the last few decades (Ryckman, 19951996).4 In the early 920s, Weyl and Reichenbach could
be considered as Einstein’s ‘agonists’–, i.e., champions of two different ‘Einsteins’ (Ryckman, 2005)—,
debating over the role of coordination of geometrical structures and measuring devices, whether the latter
must be described in the framework of general relativity or not (see also Giovanelli, 2013).
However, the latter two episodes are not well known. The correspondence (ii) has been rediscovered
and published (CPAE, Vol. 15, Docs. 224. 230, 235, 239, 244) only recently (Giovanelli, 2016a). After
some discussion on a note (HR, 025-05-10) that Reichenbach sent to Einstein for feedback, they agreed
that general relativity should not be considered a ‘geometrization’ of physical fields (Lehmkuhl, 2014). The
note was then included in a long technical Appendix to the Philosophie der Raum-Zeit-Lehre (Reichenbach,
1928a, §§46-50)–Reichenbach’s major work on the philosophy of space and time in which general relativity
is presented as a ‘physicalization of geometry’ rather than a ‘geometrizaton of gravitation’ (Giovanelli,
2021).
This study aims to add the final piece of the puzzle by analyzing the philosophical implication of
the third correspondence (iii) that has just been published (CPAE, Vol. 16, Docs. 284, 292, 384, 390,
391). In the late 1920s, Reichenbach realized that, in Einstein’s mind, the actual aim of the unified field
theory program was not the geometrization, but the unification of two different fields, an undertaking for
the sake of which Einstein was ready to embrace a strongly speculative approach to physics. This letter
exchange marked both the decline in their personal friendship and the end of their philosophical kinship.
At the end of the decade, the ‘Einstein’ Reichenbach had championed in the early of 1920s was not the
‘Einstein’ he had met again in Berlin at the end of the decade.
A few months after publishing the Philosophie der Raum-Zeit-Lehre (Reichenbach, 1928a), Einstein
launched yet another attempt at a unified field theory, the so-called Fernparallelismus- or distant
parallelism-field theory5(Einstein, 1928ec) based on a Riemannian geometry with distant parallelism in
which two vectors can be compared both as to their lengths and their directions. Reichenbach, now back
in Berlin, discussed the new theory in person with Einstein and sent him few pages of comments. The
unpublished manuscript is still extant (Reichenbach, 1928b). The correspondence that ensued, however,
soon took a negative turn. Einstein, annoyed by the unwanted attention of the press, angrily reacted to
Reichenbach’s article in a newspaper (Reichenbach, 1929c), which seemed to anticipate the last version of
the theory (Einstein, 1929g). Without alerting Reichenbach, he directly wrote a strongly worded letter of
complaint to the Editorial Board. Reichenbach perceived Einstein’s behavior as a personal betray and
replied with a sense of indignity, reminding Einstein, somewhat inelegantly, of his service in defending and
popularizing relativity theory. The feud was quickly mended; however, their personal relationship never
fully recovered.
This quarrel on a rather mundane matter might have coupled with a sense of a deeper intellectual
estrangement. As Reichenbach had come to realize, along with Einstein’s engagement with the unified
field theory program, their philosophical views had grown apart and had become hard to reconcile. In the
1920s, Reichenbach was possibly the only philosopher able to discuss eye to eye with the working physicists
on this matter. Reichenbach hoped that his critical epistemological reflections could have served, so to
speak, to tie physicists to the mast of empiricism such that they could resist to “the sirens’ enchantment
[Sirenenzauber] of a unified field theory” (Reichenbach, 1928a, 373). If relativity theory had taught us to
separate mathematics from physics, in Reichenbach’s view, the unified field theory program represented
the seducing temptation to absorb physics into mathematics. To Reichenbach’s dismay, it was Einstein
himself who did not remain deaf to sirens’ song and gave in to the lure of mathematical simplicity as the
key to physical reality. Thus, Reichenbach seems to have experienced a sense of intellectual betray of their
once-shared philosophical principles.
4For another aspect of the Reichenbach–Weyl correspondence, see Rynasiewicz, 2005.
5In modern literature the expression ‘teleparallelism’ is used. In the following, in briefly outlining Einstein’s theory, I
rely primarily on the standard historical work on the topic Sauer (2006); for an anthology of papers on distant parallelism,
see Delphenich (2013). For recent applications of this formalism, see Aldrovandi and Pereira, 2013; for a philosophical
appreciation, see Knox, 2011.
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Amidst the turmoil of the 1930s, a decade of intense personal friendship and intellectual exchange
came to an end. Paradoxically, when, in 1934, Hugo Dingler (1933, 37) launched a political attack on
Reichenbach, labeling him despairingly ‘Einstein’s self-appointed personal philosopher,’ Einstein and
Reichenbach’s philosophical views had become nearly irreconcilable. However, if the falling-out with
Einstein was certainly a bitter moment in Reichenbach’s intellectual biography, it was interwind with
one of Reichenbach’s unsung philosophical achievements. Over the years, somewhat on the margins
of his primary philosophical work on relativity theory, Reichenbach had managed to provide the first,
and possibly only, overall philosophical reflection on the unified field theory program at that time of its
peak. In this manner, Reichenbach, somewhat unwittingly, was able to formulate a sort of ‘theory of
spacetime-theories’ (Lehmkuhl, 2017b).
His well-known philosophical appreciation on general relativity was embedded in the larger context
of an often technically detailed analysis of the alternative theoretical paths that were explored in the
1920s. Reichenbach attempted to unravel the key to Einstein’s success in formulating a field theory of
gravitation by uncovering the reasons for the failure of subsequent unification attempts. In doing so,
Reichenbach produced some of the most significant examples of his style of doing philosophy, based on a
detailed logical analysis of concrete physical theories rather than on a broadly stroked investigation of
the nature of scientific thought. As Reichenbach (1936) himself emphasized, it was this approach that
set apart the ‘logical empiricism’ of his ‘Berlin group’ from both traditional philosophy and the ‘logical
positivism’ of Moritz Schlick’s ‘Vienna Circle’ (Milkov, 2013Uebel, 2013).
Ultimately, as his American students had reported later, it was this philosophical style that Reichenbach
brought with him when he moved to the United States in 1938, influencing generations of philosophers of
science on the other side of the pond (Rescher, 2006Salmon, 1999). Unfortunately, when, in 1958, the
translation of Philosophie der Raum-Zeit-Lehre was published (Reichenbach, 1958); the Appendix was not
included. This decision left subsequent generations of scholars mostly unaware of one the most interesting
aspects on Reichenbach’s early work, thus providing a somewhat impoverished image of Reichenbach’s
philosophy of space and time. The importance of Reichenbach’s debate with Weyl was not completely
appreciated, and his relationship with Einstein was seriously misunderstood. In celebrating Reichenbach’s
legacy, I hope that this study will contribute to re-establish, at least in part, a more well-rounded account
of Reichenbach as a philosopher of physics.
The structure of the paper is as follows. After setting the stage (section 1), this study analyzes two sets
of documents roughly written during the span of few months between the end of 1928 and the beginning
of 1929, both of which are related to Einstein’s Fernparallelismus field theory: (a) Reichenbach’s private
correspondence with Einstein (section 2, section 3) (b) Reichenbach’s published writings on the unified
field theory program (section 4). These two sets of documents constitutes, so to speak, the direct evidence
on which the present study relies. The documents (a) uncover a personal quarrel between Einstein and
Reichenbach; the documents (b) testify to a philosophical disagreement about the value of the unified
field theory program. The indignant tone of Reichenbach’s reply in his letter to Einstein suggests that
the personal disgruntlement might have been entangled and possibly amplified by an underlying feeling
of intellectual estrangement. At around the same time, also the members of the Vienna circle, such
as Moritz Schlick6 and Philipp Frank,7 seem to have been both baffled and disappointed by Einstein’s
anti-positivistic and rationalistic rhetoric. On top of that, Reichenbach might have felt unjustly mistreated
by Einstein. However, reasonable doubts can be raised against this additional conjecture which is based
at most on circumstantial evidence. Indeed, the personal quarrel might have taken place in the absence
of any philosophical disagreement and vice versa. Thus, the readers who are less inclined to indulge in
academic ‘gossip’ from late of 1920s might skip over section 3 and still appreciate the philosophical points
raised by Reichenbach in some of his lesser-known papers on the philosophy of space and time.
1 Einstein’s Review of the Philosophie der Raum-Zeit-Lehre
Einstein read the manuscript of the Philosophie der Raum-Zeit-Lehre (Reichenbach, 1928a) on his way
to Brussels to attend the fifth Solvay Congress (Bacciagaluppi and Valentini, 2009). In a letter to his
second wife Elsa after his arrival, he appeared impatient toward Reichenbach’s assertive style: “I finished
reading Reichenbach. To be so delighted with oneself must be pleasing, but less so for other people”
(Einstein to Elsa Einstein, Oct. 23, 1927; CPAE, Vol. 16, Doc. 34). After some weeks, in December,
6For Schlick’s reaction to Einstein’s self-characterization as a ‘metaphysician’ (Einstein to Schlick, Nov. 28, 1930; EA,
21-603; m.e.; part. tr. in Howard, 2014, 371), see Fruteau de Laclos (2007).
7For Frank’s reaction to Lanczos’s (1932) characterization of Einstein as metaphysical realist, see Frank (1947, 215) and
Frank and Kuhn (1962).
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Reichenbach wrote to Einstein that Paul Hinneberg, the editor of the Deutsche Literaturzeitung had told
him that Einstein intended to write a review of his forthcoming book, Philosophie der Raum-Zeit-Lehre.
Reichenbach sent him the galley proofs and added that he would send an Appendix in the coming days
(Einstein to Reichenbach, Dec. 1, 1927; CPAE, Vol. 16, Abs. 295). Einstein’s review appeared in the first
1928 issue of the Deutsche Literaturzeitung (Einstein, 1928d).
The review was little more than a short summary. However, Einstein emphasized two philosophically
significant issues both concerning the Appendix of the book. (1) “In the Appendix, the foundation of
the Weyl–Eddington theory is treated in a clear manner and in particular the delicate question of the
coordination of these theories to reality” (Einstein, 1928d, 20; m.e.). Reichenbach had claimed that, as
in any other theory, in unified field theory, one should give physical meaning to the variables used (gµν ,
Γτµν , etc.) from the outset before starting to search for the field equations. Einstein did not comment on
this issue, probably because, over the years, he had come to realize that this requirement was too strict.
However, Einstein was in complete agreement with the second point made by Reichenbach: (2) In the
Appendix, “in my opinion quite rightly—it is argued that the claim that general relativity is an attempt
to reduce physics to geometry is unfounded” (Einstein, 1928d, 20; m.e.). As reported, Reichenbach and
Einstein had already discussed this topic in a private correspondence less than two years earlier (Giovanelli,
2016a). Therefore, Einstein immediately perceived the importance of this theme in Reichenbach’s book, a
theme that later readers often overlooked (Giovanelli, 2021).
The issue of ‘geometrization’ was indeed close to Einstein’s heart at that time (Lehmkuhl, 2014). In the
weeks he wrote Reichenbach’s review, Einstein (Einstein to Meyerson, Dec. 24, 1927; EA, 18-294) provided
final authorization for the publication of another, more extensive review of La déduction relativiste written
by the French philosopher Émile Meyerson (Meyerson, 1925). The review was published in Spring 1928
in French (Einstein, 1928a). In the book, Meyerson had considered relativity as a central stage in the
process of progressive geometrization of physics, which had started with Descartes and that promised
to go on with the theories of Weyl and Eddington. In the context of an otherwise laudatory review,
Einstein strongly disagreed. According to Einstein, “the term ‘geometrical’ used in this context is entirely
devoid of meaning” (Einstein, 1928a, 165; m.e.). Historical reasons aside, there was no real ground to
define gµν , the gravitational field, as a geometrical field, and, say, the Fµν , the electromagnetic field, as a
non-geometrical field. The aim of the unified field theory program was not to ‘geometrize’ both fields
but to ‘unify’ them to show that they are nothing but two aspects of a unique ‘total’ field of unknown
structure. Without the equivalence principle, mathematical simplicity had become the only guide in the
quest for the fundamental field structure. Therefore, however, Einstein very much appreciated Meyerson’s
insistence on ‘the deductive-constructive character’ of relativity theory (on this episode see Giovanelli,
2018).
After the review, Einstein complained “that the works of M. Schlick and H. Reichenbach8 seem to have
escaped Mr. Meyerson” (Einstein, 1928a, 166). Nevertheless, the nearly contemporary publication of the
Reichenbach and Meyerson reviews represents—somewhat symbolically—a reconfiguration of Einstein’s
system of philosophical alliances. Indeed, for a brief time period, Meyerson became Einstein’s reference
philosopher, a position once proudly held by Schlick and Reichenbach.9 The Einstein–Reichenbach falling
out was, however, somewhat more dramatic, as testified by their early 1929 correspondence. As we
shall see, in these letters, a minor academic quibbling seems to have been superimposed to a deeper
philosophical tension concerning the very nature of physics’ enterprise. Over the years, Reichenbach had
believed himself to have given a philosophical voice to Einstein’s insistence on the separation between pure
mathematics and physics. However, back in Berlin, he found him expressing a quasi-religious belief in the
mathematical simplicity of the real as the true motivation for doing research. Einstein had become weary
of the positivism, that he saw spreading among the younger generation of quantum physicists. Einstein
often insisted that physics is ultimately a form of metaphysics, borne out of a deep-rooted requirement to
understand the real and not simply make correct predictions (Giovanelli, 2018).
2 Einstein’s Fernparallelismus-Field Theory and Reichenbach’s Objections
The reasons behind Einstein’s philosophical turn will become apparent in the immediate following months
as Einstein started to work on his next unified field theory. During a period of prolonged convalescence,
Einstein explored a generalization of Riemannian geometry that he considered as unknown, in which a
notion of parallelism between vectors at two distant points can be defined. In a note presented at the
8The name of Reichenbach was added in the last draft possibly after Reichenbach read the Philosophie der Raum-Zeit-Lehre
on his way to Bruxelles.
9On this point see also section IV of the ‘Introduction’ to CPAE, Vol. 16.
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Academy on June 7 (Einstein, 1928e), he introduced a new formalism, based on the concept of n-Bein
(or n-legs), n unit orthogonal vectors representing a local coordinate system attached at a point of n
dimensional continuum. The n-Bein is called Vierbein for four dimensions.10 Let Aa be the components of
a vector A with respect to the n-bein. For describing a finite region, one can introduce a so-called Gaussian
coordinate system11 xν . Then, Aν are the components of the vector A with respect to xν . Thus, if one
define the hνa as the ν-component of the a n-bein, one has Aν = hνaAa. Thus, in Einstein’s notation, Greek
letters denote the coordinate indices (Koordinaten-Indizes) and Latin letters n-bein indices (Bein-Indizes).
By postulating the existence of the n-bein field hνa, Einstein could introduce the notion of distant
parallelism of such vectors. Two vectors A and B at distant points can be considered as equal and parallel
if they have the same local coordinates with respect to their n-bein. The metric can be written as the
product of two n-beins:
gµν = hµahνa . [1]
in which a is to be summed over. In addition to the usual affine connection Γτµν determined by the metric
gµν ,12 one can define the notion of parallel transport through the n-bein, introducing thereby a separate













+ ∆iαl∆αkm −∆iαm∆αkl ≡ 0 ,
which identically vanishes (Einstein, 1928e, 219). Because the n-bein determines the metric, but not the
other way around, it provides more degrees of freedom—16 components of the vierbein compared to the
10 of the metric. Einstein expected that the former could be exploited to incorporate the electromagnetic
field alongside the gravitational field.
A second note was presented a few days later on June 14 (Einstein, 1928c). Einstein noted that the
non-symmetric part of the displacement Λναβ = ∆νσµ −∆νµσ 14 could serve to describe electromagnetic field
potential. A ‘pure gravitational’ field is present when ϕµ = Λαµα = 0, where ϕµ is the electromagnetic
four potential. Thus, the vierbein-field hνa defines both the metric tensor gµν and the electromagnetic
four-potential ϕµ. Its sixteen components can be considered as the fundamental dynamical variables
of the theory. The question arises as to the field equations that determine the vierbein-field. Similar
to multiple previous field theories, the field equations were supposed to be derived from a variational
principle, δ
∫
{Hdτ} = 0, where H depends on the n-bein field. By taking the variation of the action
with respect to the variable hνa, both Einstein and Maxwell field equations were recovered in first-order
approximation (Einstein, 1928c, 226). Einstein concluded that the separation of the gravitational and
electromagnetic field becomes arbitrary. An invariant difference between the two fields manifests itself
only in the special case of weak fields (Einstein, 1928c, 227).
2.1 Reichenbach’s Letter on Fernparallelismus-Field Theory and the Manuscript
As reported, at that time, Reichenbach was probably the only ‘professional’ philosopher that could make
his way through the mathematical intricacies of such a theory. The attention of the actual work of scientists
characterized the philosophical style of Reichenbach and the group of scholars that gathered around him in
Berlin (Danneberg, Kamlah, and Schäfer, 1994Milkov and Peckhaus, 2013): a concrete, internal analysis
of the structure of the latest scientific theories, rather than an abstract, external investigation of scientific
reasoning as such (McMullin, 1970). As Reichenbach had done little more the two years before—after
Einstein had published his affine-metric theory (Einstein, 1925b)— he was quick in reviewing Einstein’s
papers (Einstein, 1928ce) by sending him a few comments to receive some feedback:
Dear Herr Einstein,
I did some serious thinking on your work on the field theory and I reported that the geometrical
10The terms n-bein, vielbeins, and vierbein are still in usage in English-speaking literature, although the expression ‘tetrad’
seems to have prevailed over vierbein.
11A generalization of the geodesic polar coordinates introduced by Gauss (1828) in his theory of surfaces; fo the use of
such coordinate system in a relativistic setting, see e.g., Hilbert, 1917.
12The so-called Levi-Civita connection.
13The so-called Weizenböck connection.
14A three-index tensor called the ‘the torsion tensor’ in modern language.
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construction can be presented better in a different form. I send you the ms. enclosed. Concerning
the physical application of your work, frankly speaking, it did not convince me much. If geometrical
interpretation must be, then I found my approach simply more beautiful in which the straightest line at
least means something. Or do you have additional expectations for your new work? (Reichenbach to
Einstein, Oct. 17, 1928 EA, 20-92; m.e.).
With his characteristic self-confidence, Reichenbach was blunt to express skepticism toward Einstein’s and
other attempts at a unified field theory. There are two aspects of this passage that should be separately
considered.
In the first part of the passage, Reichenbach addresses the mathematical-geometrical aspect of Einstein’s
approach. Reichenbach, in the Appendix of the Philosophie der Raum-Zeit-Lehre, had provided a sort
of classification of geometries based on the relations between the metric and the affine connection (or
displacement) (Reichenbach, 1928a, §46; see Giovanelli, 2021). He regarded Einstein’s new geometrical
setting as nothing but a variation of the Weyl–Eddington–Schouten line of thought15 , and thus naturally
entered in his classification of geometries: it was a metrical space with vanishing curvature with a non-
symmetric affine connection. Reichenbach’s insistence on this point was probably related to Reichenbach’s
second point. If Fernparallelismus was nothing but one of the possibilities to explore in the Weyl–
Eddington–Schouten lineage, Reichenbach could raise the same objection against Einstein’s new theory
that he had raised against the previous theories by Weyl (1918; 1921), Eddington (1921), and Einstein
(1923; 1925).
Assume one wants to give a geometrical interpretation of a combined gravitational/electromagnetic
field using the affine connection as a fundamental variable; in that case, one should at least provide a
coordinate definition of the operation of parallel displacement of vectors before starting to search for the
field equations. Otherwise, it is hard to understand in which sense one could test whether the latter made
correct predictions. In particular, Einstein’s geometry implies the existence of a straight line, a line of
which all elements are parallel to each other, which is not identical with a geodesic (Einstein, 1928c, 224).
However, as Reichenbach reported, the latter has no physical meaning in Einstein’s theory. From this
point of view, the toy theory he proposed in the §49 of Appendix to the Philosophie der Raum-Zeit-Lehre
was preferable. Indeed, Reichenbach had used a geometrical setting cognate to that of Einstein’s—a
non-flat metric space with a non-symmetric connection. In such a geometry, the straightest and shortest
lines were different. However, they were both physically ‘realized,’ in the paths of charged and uncharged
test particles under the influence of electromagnetic and gravitational fields.
2.2 The Manuscript
The details of both arguments were presented in a typewritten manuscript (see fig. 1) enclosed in the
letter, which has been preserved among Einstein’s papers (Reichenbach, 1928b). It bears the title “Zur
Einordnung des neuen Einsteinschen Ansatzes über Gravitation und Elektrizität.” The first part of the
manuscript introduces a classification of geometries. It is an early draft of the paper that Reichenbach
submitted toward the end of January 1929 and was later published in the same year (Reichenbach, 1929d).
The published paper differs mostly in the last part in which Reichenbach draws certain philosophical
conclusions from his analysis. In the following, I will present the content of the manuscript. Reichenbach’s
exposition is straightforward but quite elliptic. Reichenbach could assume that the reader was familiar
with the fundamental concepts of differential geometry and possibly with his presentation of the latter
in the Appendix of the Philosophie der Raum-Zeit-Lehre (Reichenbach, 1928a, §46). Because the latter
has not been translated, in the ensuing pages, I will follow roughly Reichenbach’s line of reasoning but
introduce some explanatory remarks.
Reichenbach’s Classification of Geometries. According to Reichenbach, the way Einstein introduced his
Riemannian geometry with distant parallelism (Einstein, 1928ce) could lead to the impression that it was
“a conceptual construction not yet covered by the previously developed geometric theory” (Reichenbach,
1928b, 1). In particular, the title of Einstein’s study seems to connect, somewhat paradoxically, Riemannian
geometry and parallelism at a distance, whereas Riemannian geometry is usually characterized by the
absence of such parallelism. It seems then that Einstein had introduced “a hitherto unheard-of intermediate
15I borrowed the expression “Gedanken–Reihe Weyl—Eddington–Schouten” from Einstein (Einstein to Besso, Jun. 5,
1925; CPAE, Vol. 15, Doc. 2). All these researchers retained the four-dimensional characteristic of physical spacetime, but
introduced a manifold with a more general affine connection: by weakening the compatibility condition between the metric
and affine connection, and thus introducing two sorts of curvature (Weyl, 1918b); by adopting a symmetric affine connection
as the fundamental variable without reference to the metric (Eddington, 1921); by dropping the symmetry of the connection
(Schouten, 1924).
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Figure 1: First page of Reichenbach’s manuscript (Reichenbach, 1928b)
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construct [Zwischengebilde] between Riemannian and Euclidean geometry” (Reichenbach, 1928b, 1).
Reichenbach aimed to demonstrate that this was not the case. According to Reichenbach, “Einstein’s
space has its precisely defined logical place in the structure [Gebäude] of the Weyl–Eddington geometry”
(Reichenbach, 1928b, 1). To prove his point, Reichenbach resorted to the classification of non-Riemannian
geometries that he had outlined in the Appendix to the Philosophie der Raum-Zeit-Lehre. The manuscript
offers a more streamlined presentation of the lengthy §46 of the latter (Reichenbach, 1928a, §46; see
Giovanelli, 2021 for more details). As in the book, Reichenbach presented Weyl’s separation between the
metric and the affine connection or displacement but using a notation taken from the German translation
(Eddington, 1925) of Eddington’s textbook on relativity (Eddington, 1923). However, Reichenbach
generalized Eddington’s presentation with Schouten (1922; 1922)’s idea that the affine connection can be
non-symmetric.
Reichenbach attributes to Weyl (1918a) what he considered the fundamental achievement of modern
differential geometry, the recognition of the independence of the so-called ‘displacement’ Γτµν and the
metric gµν . To briefly introduce these two notions, Reichenbach proceeds as follows. Let us assume
that an arbitrary coordinate system is spread over a region such that each point is identified by a set
of n numbers xν (where ν = 1, 2, 3, 4, . . . ). Riemannian geometry is based on the hypothesis that, in
Einstein’s notation (where summation over repeated indices is implied), the squared distance ds between
two neighboring points, xν and xν + dxν is given by:
ds2 = gµνdxµdxν . [3]
The coefficients gµν = gνµ are the components of the metric (or measurement) tensor—a set of n(n+ 1)/2
independent functions that serve to convert coordinate distances dxν between two closed-by spacetime
points into actual distances. As the coordinates xν and xν + dxν of two neighboring the numerical value
of the distance ds between them can be obtained from [3]. A unique measure (up to a global choice of unit
of measure) can be given to the so-called ‘line element’ ds, such that any distance can be compared with
any other distance. In Euclidean geometry, it is always possible to introduce a coordinate system, the
so-called Cartesian coordinate system, in which gµν are constant, but this is not so in the general case.16
It is the merit of Weyl to have introduced a generalization of such geometrical setting into relativistic
literature. One can think of dxν as the components of a (contravariant) vector Aτ , n numbers Aµ
(A1, A2, A3, A4, . . . An) that we associate with some point P and transform as per certain rules by the
change of coordinates. In Euclidean geometry, it is always possible to introduce a Cartesian coordinate
system in which two vectors are equal and parallel when they have the same components. However, this
relation does not hold if we introduce curvilinear coordinates, e.g., polar coordinates. Although parallel
vectors are still parallel in the new coordinate system, the equality of the components of two parallel
vectors attached to two different points in space is not preserved.17 Consequently, vectors at different
points can no longer be directly compared. If one displaces a vector to a neighboring point dxν , one
does not know whether the vector has remained the ‘same’ by simply examining its components. The





















The Γτµν vanish identically in Euclidean geometry in Cartesian coordinates but not in non-Cartesian coordinates where
the gµν are functions of the coordinates. We might want to determine whether it is possible to transform a given gµν -system
into the normal matrix ḡµν with constant coefficients. By a suitable choice of the coordinate system, it is always possible
to introduce the ḡµν for a single point. However, one cannot establish in which case the variability of the gµν can be
transformed away over larger regions of spacetime by simply examining the components of the gµν . One requires to introduce
a formal criterion. The latter was reported to be a certain combination gµν , ∂gµν/∂xσ , ∂2gµν/∂xσ∂xτ . It is called the
Riemann tensor and can be considered as the gradient of the gµν . If one uses the Christoffel symbols as a shorthand for the
































Rτµνσ(g) has n4 components. The vanishing of the Riemann tensor is the necessary condition that, by an appropriate choice
of coordinates, the metric coefficients assumed the values ḡµν .
17E.g., consider two unit vectors Aτ and A∗τ on a plane pointing along the x direction: one at the point at (0, 1) and
another at (1, 0) in Cartesian coordinates. In this coordinate system, Aτ and A∗τ have the same components, i.e., they are
equal and parallel. However, in polar coordinates r, ϑ (where r represents distance from the origin, and ϑ represents the
angle that the point makes with the origin and the positive x-axis), Aτ has only a r component, whereas A∗τ has only a ϑ
component. Nevertheless, they are still equal and parallel. Indeed, the vector A∗τ can be obtained by displacing Aτ parallel
to itself along a circle. In polar coordinates, the components Aτ change at each point even though its length and direction
remain the same.
8
‘connection’ (Zusammenhang) from a point to another is lost. Because the affine geometry is the study of
parallel lines, Weyl (1918c) used to speak of the necessity of establishing an ‘affine connection’ (affiner
Zusammenhang). However, because it is a relation of ‘sameness’ rather than parallelism that is relevant in
this context, others, such as Reichenbach, prefer to speak of the operation of ‘displacement’ (Verschiebung),
where the latter indicates the small coordinate difference dxν along which the vector is transferred.
Displacement. To reinstate the ‘connection’ one requires to introduce a rule for comparing vectors at
infinitesimally separated points. Given a vector Aτ at xν in an arbitrary coordinate system, we need to
determine the components of the vector A∗τ at xν + dxν that is to be considered the ‘same vector’ as the
given vector Aτ . The vector Aτ at the point P (xν) and the vector Aτ + dAτ at the point P ∗ (xν + dxν)
are the ‘same vector,’ if they satisfy the condition:
dAτ = ΓτµνAµdxν . [6]
The quantity Γτµν is known as the affine connection or displacement. It has three indices, i.e., entails τ
possible combinations of µ × ν coefficients, which can vary arbitrarily from point to point, i.e., in the
general case, are functions of xν . Because in general Γτµν 6= Γτνµ, the Γτµν has n× n2 coefficients.
Starting with a vector Aτ at a point P with coordinates xν , one may transfer it along dxν to the point
P ∗ with coordinates xν + dxν ; using [6], one can compute the components of the vector A∗τ at P ∗ that is
equal and parallel to Aτ at P in any coordinate system. One can continue this process step after step
from Aτ to A∗τ to A∗∗τ ; as the size of each displacement goes to 0, one obtains a continuous curve xν(s):
dAτ
ds
= ΓτµνAµAν . [7]
If a vector is given at P , this vector may be moved parallel to itself along the curve from P to P ∗; for
given initial values of Aτ , [7] yields the unknown components of the vector A∗τ , which is being subjected
to a continuous parallel displacement, in which each step is labeled by the parameter s. Thus, [7] picks
up the straightest among all possible curves between P and P ∗. The vector Aτ at P and A∗τ at P ∗ are
defined to be the ‘same’ vector at different points along the same straightest line, i.e., they are equal in
direction and length. Thus, the displacement allows for comparing lengths, albeit only along the same
straightest line. In general, the vector A∗τ at P ∗, at a definite distance from P , is coordinated to the





where the integral s depends on the path (i.e., we will get a different vector A∗τ if we choose a different
path). Thus, in general, it is meaningless to speak of the ‘same vector’ at different distant points. If two
vectors are equal in direction and length (A∗τ −Aτ = 0) at P , whether they are equal in direction and
length at P ∗, depends on the path they are transported along. In the general case, parallel transport is
non-integrable (Reichenbach, 1928b, 2). Thus, the operation of displacement is inherently near-geometrical.
Metric. The displacement allows to establish whether two vectors are the ‘same,’ i.e., having the same
length and the same direction. However, it does not provide a measure of the length of differently directed
vectors. For this purpose, the notion of dot product of two vectors must be introduced, which, taking the
components of the two vectors, returns a single number. In particular, the squared length l of a vector is
given by the dot product of the vector with itself l2. In an arbitrary coordinate system, the latter takes
the form:
l2 = gµνAµAν , [9]
where the gµν is the metric. If Aτ is considered to correspond to dxν , [9] is nothing but [3] and l
corresponds to ds. However, this notation is more general. One can take Aτ to be dxν/ds, (where ds
is the timelike interval, which is an element of the four-dimensional trajectory of a moving point), l is
the length of the four-velocity vector uν , d2xν/ds2 is the four-acceleration vector. Using a somewhat
idiosyncratic language, Reichenbach calls the metric the operation of distant-geometrical comparison of
lengths of vectors:







In other words, if two vectors are of equal length (l∗ − l = 0) at P , they will be equal length at P ∗,
irrespective of the path they are transported along. According to Reichenbach’s parlance, for a manifold
to be a metrical space, it is insufficient that the dot product is defined at every point (i.e., it is possible
to compare the lengths of vectors at the same point in different directions); moreover, the dot product
should not change under parallel transport. In this case, the length of vectors is said to be ‘integrable.’
Relation between metric and displacement. Reichenbach had defined two operations, a near-geometrical
operation of comparison of vectors, i.e., the displacement, and a distant-geometrical operation, i.e., the
metric. The two operations relate to two different subjects: “the metric says nothing about the comparison
of direction, while the displacement does not provide a measure of the vector length” (Reichenbach, 1928b,
1). Nevertheless, “the two operations can meet if the length of two vectors Aτ and A∗τ is compared at
different locations” (Reichenbach, 1928b, 1). Although the purely affine notion of vectors is insufficient to
define the length of a vector in general, it does allow for comparing lengths of parallel vectors. In this
case, the two operations, the displacement and the metric, refer to a common subject. Therefore, they
might contradict each other. Two vectors at different points that are of unequal lengths l∗ − l 6= 0 as per
[10] might be of equal lengths A∗τ −Aτ = 0 as per [8] depending on what the path is selected between
these two points (Reichenbach, 1928b, 2).
The most general method of avoiding this difficulty would be to consider the two operations—the
metric and the displacement—as two mutually independent operations. However, Reichenbach considered
it reasonable to single out the class of ‘balanced spaces’ (ausgeglichener Raum), i.e., spaces in which certain
degree of compatibility between the metric and displacement is assured. The metric and displacement are
two independent geometrical operations. Thus to define a ‘balanced space,’ one requires to impose their
compatibility as a separate condition (Reichenbach, 1928b, 2-3). Following Eddington (1921), Reichenbach












+ Γµσ,ν + Γνσ,µ{
→ Kµν,σ
)AµAνdxσ [11]
The tensor18 Kµν,σ measures the degree compatibility of metric and connection. The metric and connection
are completely compatible, if [11] vanishes:
Kµν,σ = 0 . [12]
A space in which the condition [12] holds is called a ‘metric space,’ otherwise a ‘displacement space.’
Reichenbach emphasized that “[i]t is of considerable importance that this condition does not directly lead
to a Riemannian space,” because “the latter requires an additional restrictive condition” (Reichenbach,
1928b, 3):
Γτµν = Γτνµ . [13]







The components of Γτµν have the same numerical values of the so-called Christoffel symbols of the second
kind (up to a sign) because they are calculated from the metric gµν and its first derivatives.20 If one
starts with a symmetric metric gµν , the Christoffel symbols are, so to speak, indeed the only possible
choice; thus, the complete compatibility of the metric and the connection is assured from the outset.
However, if one defines the operation of displacement independently from the metric, the Riemannian
connection [14] appears only as a special case that is achieved by introducing a series of arbitrary
‘specializations.’ Therefore, Weyl’s formalism opened a vast array of possibilities that physicists hoped
to exploit to accommodate the electromagnetic field in the geometrical structure of spacetime. In this
particular context, it is important to realize that “[t]he general metric space” given by [12] is “different
18The non-metricity tensor in modern parlance.
19Also called the Levi–Civita connection.
20See above, fn. 16.
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from the Riemannian space; the Riemannian space is the specialization of the metric space given by [13]”
(Reichenbach, 1928b, 3).
While previous approaches used a type of displacement space (Weyl)21 or were even satisfied with
an unbalanced space (Eddington),22 the ‘new’ Einstein’s approach uses a metric space. According to
Reichenbach, “Einstein’s idea in [Einstein, 1928e] comprises introducing a different specialization of the
general metrical space [13]. He requires that beyond the condition [12], one demands that the transfer of
direction given by [6] is integrable” (Reichenbach, 1928b, 3). If the transfer of length and direction is
integrable, a vector set up in P denotes a ‘congruent’ vector in every other place without reference to a
path of transportation. Integrability occurs only in a particular class of spaces in which it is allowable
to speak of the ‘same’ vector at two different distant points P and P ∗. Spaces in which the direction is
integrable are characterized by the fact that Γτµν can be made to vanish everywhere by a suitable choice of
coordinates, i.e., by introducing linear coordinates (such as Cartesian coordinates). To determine whether







+ ΓτανΓαµσ − ΓτασΓαµσ , [15]
which is required to vanish:
Rτµνσ(Γ) = 0 . [16]
As Reichenbach reported, it is important that the condition [16], the vanishing of the Riemann tensor, “can
be formulated as a condition only for the Γτµν , without making any assumption about the relations of the
Γτµν to the gµν . It is important that for [16], the symmetry Γτµν as per [13] is not assumed” (Reichenbach,
1928b, 4).
Usually, one introduces the additional specialization “[16] only when one goes from the Riemannian
space to the Euclidean space” (Reichenbach, 1928b, 3). However, because the condition of symmetry is
not imposed, Einstein could introduce an alternative geometry. Einstein’s space is thus characterized by
the conditions [12] and [16]; the latter is a condition for the Γτµν alone while the former is a rule for the
relationship between the Γτµν and gµν . It is a metric space with a distant parallelism; however, it differs
from the Euclidean space by the asymmetry of the Γτµν . Only by imposing the conditions [12], [13], and
[16], one obtains the Euclidean space. Reichenbach summarizes his classification in fig. 2. As one can
infer from this scheme, according to Reichenbach, the Fernparallelismus space “is not a special case of the
Riemannian space,” as Einstein had claimed, “but should be placed near to him” (Reichenbach, 1928b, 5).
Its possibility is based on what Reichenbach called the exchangeability of the specializations, “leading from
the metric to the Euclidean space” (Reichenbach, 1928b, 5). Indeed, because it is shown in fig. 2, there
are two paths from the general metrical space to the Euclidean space. They are defined by exchanging the
order of the conditions [13] and [14]. From a geometrical point of view, Einstein’s space can be described
as a space in which there are parallels but not parallelograms. In this type of space, “as in general metric
space, the straightest lines and the shortest lines fall apart” (Reichenbach, 1928b, 6).
Einstein’s Unified Field Theory. Using this semi-technical presentation, Reichenbach was able to show
that Einstein’s Fernparallelismus geometry was simply one of the possibilities implicit in the Weyl–
Eddington–Schouten classification. Starting from the two structures gµν and Γτµν , one can decide to drop
the condition [12] or [13] or [16]. In this manner, one can envisage at least four possibilities (see Infeld,
1928). Einstein’s Fernparallelismus was just one of them that had not yet been exploited. The continuity
with the previous attempts was obscured by the fact that Einstein introduced an unsual formalism in
which the Γτµν and the gµν are considered as functions of a set of parameters hνα (the ν projections on the
α orthogonal unit vectors forming the so-called n-bein):23
gµν = hµαhνα Γτµν = −hτα
∂hµα
∂xν
It can be shown that this Ansatz satisfies the condition [12] and [16] (Reichenbach, 1928b, 6). The Γτµν
corresponds to ∆νµσ in Einstein’s paper (see eqs. [1] and [2]).
21By relaxing the metric-compatibility condition Kµν,σ = κσgµν , one arrives at a ‘displacement space.’ If one imposes the
condition Γτµν = Γτνµ, one obtains Weyl space as a special case.
22Eddington (1921) moved beyond Weyl, introducing a symmetric Γτµν without reference to the metric. Lengths, even at
the same point in different directions, are not comparable.
23Unlike Einstein, Reichenbach assigned Greek letters to both the Koordinaten-Indizes and Bein-Indizes.
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Figure 2: Diagram of Reichenbach’s classification of geometries Reichenbach, 1928b, 5
After having presented the n-bein mathematical apparatus very briefly, Reichenbach raised certain
concerns about its physical interpretation. In addition to complaining about the typographical errors in
certain formulas (Goldstein and Ritter, 2003, 121), Reichenbach was ultimately not very impressed by
Einstein’s results. As he rightly reported, “[t]he derivation of the Maxwellian and gravitational equation
from a variational principle was already achieved by other approaches” (Reichenbach, 1928b, 6), like, say,
Einstein–Eddington purely affine theory. Moreover, in the first part of the manuscript, Reichenbach had
demonstrated that Einstein’s theory could be classified as yet another variation of the Weyl–Eddington
approach, based on the independence of two operations of comparison of vectors based on the gµν and
Γτµν . According to Reichenbach, as in previous theories, a “real physical achievement is obtained only
if, moreover, the operation of displacement is filled with physical content” (Reichenbach, 1928b, 7). In
Reichenbach’s view, unless the geometrical operations introduced into the foundations of the theory can
be directly identified with the behavior of real objects, the theory, once the field equations have been
found and suitable solutions calculated, cannot be compared with experience. The success of relativity
theory lay in the fact that spacetime measurements performed with real physical systems (rods and clocks,
light rays, free-falling particles, etc.) are better predicted than in previous theories. However, in Einstein’s
Fernparallelismus theory, the Γτµν did not have any physical meaning from the outset.
However, Reichenbach proudly claimed that “it was previously shown by me that the latter result
can be achieved,” (Reichenbach, 1928b, 7)—in §49 of the Appendix of the Philosophie der Raum-Zeit-
Lehre. Reichenbach noted the similarity between Einstein and his approach. In the book, he had used a
metric space with a non-symmetric connection. Einstein’s space is simply characterized by an additional
condition that the Riemann tensor vanishes [16]. Another similarity is that “skew-symmetric part of
the Γτµν is used to characterize the electrical field” (Reichenbach, 1928b, 7) even in a different manner.
However, Reichenbach had suggested that one can tentatively adopt the velocity four-vector uτ as the
physical realization of the operation of displacement Γτµν . In this manner, this geometrical structure
has a clear physical meaning. Because the Γτµν is non-symmetric, straightest and shortest lines do not
coincide. Charged mass points move (i.e., their velocity four-vector is parallel-transported) along the
straightest lines, and uncharged particles move along the straightest lines that are at the same time the
shortest ones (or rather, the timelike worldlines of extremal length).24 Thus, Reichenbach insisted that it
would be preferable if one could provide a physical interpretation “of the so sharply distinct straightest
line” (Reichenbach, 1928b, 7). However, Reichenbach concluded he had been “not able to identify a
sharply distinguished interpretation of the operation of displacement for the new Einsteinian approach”
24In a manuscript (HR, 025-05-10) that he had sent to Einstein (Einstein to Reichenbach, Mar. 24, 1926; CPAE, Vol. 15,
Doc. 235) and later became §49 of the Appendix to Philosophie der Raum-Zeit-Lehre (Reichenbach, 1928a, §49), Reichenbach
came out with the following theory. He introduced a non-symmetric affine connection Γτµν , which is the addition of a
symmetric displacement (the Christoffel symbols) and a skew-symmetric tensor with two lower indices:










ϕτµν entails the left-hand side of Maxwell’s equations with sources. In the presence of charge, the Γτµν is non-Riemannian,
charged particles move on the straightest lines, and uncharged particles on the shortest lines. In the absence of charge, ϕτµν
vanishes, and the connection reduces to that of Riemannian geometry. Einstein criticized this definition for being overly
artificial (Einstein to Reichenbach, Mar. 31, 1926; CPAE, Vol. 15, Doc. 239). However, Reichenbach wanted to demonstrate
that most ‘geometrizations’ were indeed artificial (Reichenbach to Einstein, Apr. 4, 1926; CPAE, Vol. 15, Doc. 244).
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(Reichenbach, 1928b, 7).
2.3 Einstein’s Reply and his Comments on Reichenbach’s Manuscript
Reichenbach’s claim that, in his unified field theory, the straightest lines have physical meaning was
certainly questionable. Einstein had already reported a few years before that Reichenbach’s theory was
untenable (Giovanelli, 2016b). The charged particles of different charge-to-mass ratio e/m, starting from the
same initial conditions, cannot travel on the same paths of the ‘same’ connection. However, more generally,
Einstein disagreed with Reichenbach’s philosophical requirement that the geometrical/kinematical concepts
should receive a coordinate definition, ex ante, separately from the dynamical equations of the theory. At
first sight, this requirement might sound rather ‘Einsteinian.’ However, Einstein had later insisted that
possible experiences must correspond not to geometry as an isolated part of a physical theory but only to the
theory as a whole (Einstein, 19211923a19241925c1926). Thus, Einstein did not comment on Reichenbach’s
epistemological remarks. However, he expressed certain mild skepticism toward Reichenbach’s classification
of geometries:
Dear Mr. Reichenbach,
In my opinion, the logical presentation of the theory that you proposed is possible; however, it is
not the simplest from a logical point of view. The best logical classification, in my view, seems
to be the following: One consider theories in which the local comparison of vector length is given
as meaningful (zero-metric the gµν are given only up to a factor). For the manifolds of this type,
additional specializations are possible.
1. Neither the comparison of length at distance nor of direction is meaningful (Weyl)
2. Comparison at distance of length but not of direction is meaningful (Riemann)
3. Comparison at distance of directions but not of lengths (not considered yet)
4. Comparison at distance of length and of direction is meaningful (Einstein)
Of course, one can start with the displacement law and specialize it, on the one hand, with the
introduction of a metric, and, on the other hand, with the introduction of integrability properties as
you have done; however, this is less simple and natural.
The naturalness of the case of field structure that I have considered seems undeniable to me. Whether
this construction contains deeper traits of reality might become clear to me only in the next months
because the decision of the problem to solve are in no way simple (Einstein to Reichenbach, Oct. 19,
1928; CPAE, Vol. 16, Doc. 292)
Einstein preferred to present his geometrical settings not as a type of affine space but as an intermediate
case, situated between Riemannian and Euclidean geometry. Weyl’s geometry does not allow a comparison
of either lengths or directions of vectors at a finite distance. Riemann’s geometry only permits a comparison
of lengths. Einstein’s ‘new’ geometry allows both. According to Einstein, Reichenbach’s classification
was possible but not natural. This opinion, however, strikes with the modern point of view, which would
identify Einstein’s classification possible but Reichenbach’s more natural (Goldstein and Ritter, 2003,
121Sauer, 2006). Einstein probably was keen to present Fernparallelismus with its new n-bein formalism
as an alternative rather than a continuation of the failed Weyl–Eddington–Schouten approach. However,
Reichenbach had the opposite interest in insisting on the continuity of the new Fernparallelismus approach
with previous unification attempts. In this manner, he could hit them all out with one strike using the
same argument.
To mitigate his criticism, in a note added by hand to the typescripted letter, Einstein invited over
Reichenbach and his second wife for tea on November 21, adding that Erwin Schrödinger would attend.
Although the details of this meeting are not known, as one can infer from the subsequent turn of the
events, they probably discussed Einstein’s last work; it is hard to imagine that the difference of their
philosophical approaches did not emerge during those conversations. A few weeks after he wrote to
Reichenbach, Einstein was asked to contribute to a Festschrift on the occasion of the seventieth birthday
of Aurel Stodola, Professor of Mechanical Engineering at the ETH (Honegger to Einstein, Nov. 2, 1928;
CPAE, Vol. 16, Doc. abs. 732; Einstein to Honegger, Nov. 14, 1928; CPAE, Vol. 16, Doc. abs. 750; cf.
Einstein, 1929d). Einstein agreed to contribute with a semi-popular review article on his new theory, Über
den gegenwärtigen Stand der Feldtheorie (Einstein, 1929f). The manuscript was submitted on December 10
(see Sauer, 2006). Einstein’s philosophical stance took a turn that Reichenbach probably did not predict.
Einstein insisted on the speculative nature of the new theory, which, however, he presented as a
continuation of the same strategy that was successful in his search for the field theory of gravitation:
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individuate a suitable field structure, the gµν , and search for simplest differential generally covariant
equations that can be obeyed by the gµν . For general relativity, the choice of the gµν was suggested by a
physical fact, the equivalence principle. However, in the search for a more general mathematical structure
that would include the electromagnetic field, Einstein continued, “the experience does not give—so it
seems—any starting point” (Einstein, 1929f, 128). Thus, the only hope is to develop a theory “in a
speculative way” (Einstein, 1929f, 128). To solve this problem, the physicist must venture along “a purely
intellectual path” having as only motivation the deep conviction of the “formal simplicity of the structure
of reality” (Einstein, 1929f, 127). The belief in the fundamental simplicity of the real is “so to speak, the
religious basis of the scientific endeavor” (Einstein, 1929f, 127).
Indeed, for Fernparallelismus, no attempt was made to give a direct physical meaning to the fundamental
field variables hνa. One starts from this mathematical structure and then searches for the simplest and most
natural field equations that the vierbein-field can satisfy (Einstein, 1929f, 131). The physical soundness
of the field equations thus found can be confirmed only by integrating them, which was usually a very
difficult task. Einstein warned his readers of the dangers of proceeding “along this speculative road”
(Einstein, 1929f, 127). In a footnote, Einstein even endorsed “Meyerson’s comparison with Hegel’s program
[Zielsetzung]” which “illuminates clearly the danger that one here has to fear” (Einstein, 1929f, 127).
3 The Vossische Zeitung Affair. The Einstein–Reichenbach Falling-Out
3.1 Fernparallelismus in the Daily Press
At about the same time, Einstein’s theory had started attracting irrational attention in the daily press.
On November 4, the New York Times announced the prospect of another epoch-making breakthrough in
an article bearing the tabloid-like headline: ‘Einstein on Verge of Great Discovery; Resents Intrusion.’
The author of the piece, Paul D. Miller, gave an account of how he had succeeded in visiting Einstein
in his Berlin home. Despite expressing resentment for being interrupted by reporters, Einstein did not
hesitate to feed the press’s need for sensationalism. He told Miller that he was “treading on the edge of a
great scientific discovery, one that will startle the world far more than the relativity theory” (Miller, 1928).
Einstein was, however, “unwilling to speak” about the details “until he is satisfied with the presentation”
(Miller, 1928). Indeed, 10 days later, on November 14, the New York Times doubled down with an article
entitled “Einstein Reticent on New Work; Will Not ‘Count Unlaid Eggs’” (cit. in Pais, 1982, 346).
As it turned out, difficulties with the theory had started to become apparent by the end of 1928. A
few days after sending his manuscript for the Stodola Festschrift, he wrote to Hermann Müntz that he had
the “insolent idea [freche Idee]” of throwing “the Hamiltonian principle overboard” because it allowed too
many possibilities. This alternative approach (see Sauer, 2006, 4.3) turned out to be “a more subtle task”
than Einstein initially considered. Thus, a few days in late December, he got back to the “old Hamilton
method once again” (Einstein to Müntz, Dec. 18, 1928; CPAE, Vol. 16, Doc. 341). However, toward the
end of the year, Einstein gave up again on the ‘variational approach’ (Einstein to Müntz, Dec. 27, 1928;
CPAE, Vol. 16, Doc. 351). The new result was presented in a brief paper, completed by January 5, 1929.
Einstein anticipated the skepticism of his colleagues because the theory was incapable of addressing the
quantum problem. However, he was confident that the spacetime approach would come back in fashion
again and the “statical craze”25 would fade (Einstein to Besso, Jan. 5, 1929).
The manuscript was submitted on January 10 for publication in the Sitzungsberichte Prussian Academy
(Einstein, 1929g). On January 11, 1929, Einstein issued a brief statement to the press (CPAE, 16; abs.
822). The New York Times immediately followed up with a another sensationalistic article: “the length of
this work—written at the rate of half a page a year is considered prodigious when it is considered that
the original presentation of his theory of relativity filled only three pages” (New York Times, January
12, 1929, cit. in Pais, 1982, 346). Indeed, it was puzzling that an abstract theory might identify such
resonance among laypeople. Surprised by this reaction, Einstein issued a new statement to the Jewish
Telegraphic Agency on January 14, insisting that the theory was a “purely mathematical extension of the
general theory of relativity”; there was nothing “to be excited about it”, and he could not understand
“why the newspaper should take an interest in it” (CPAE, Vol. 16, Doc. 370). In private correspondence,
he admitted his partial responsibility for the craze because he “may have alluded to it in speaking with
one or another of my friends” (Einstein to Kerkhof, Jan. 16, 1929; CPAE, Vol. 16, Doc. 373). Although
Einstein himself made certain revelation to the press, he could not have been the only source of these
rumors, which were often misleading (see Pais, 1982, 346). As seen, Einstein had discussed the theory
with Reichenbach in late 1928, in the presence of Schrödinger, and indeed, he will soon be accused of
being one of the ‘leakers.’
25That is the new quantum mechanics.
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In this atmosphere of excitement, Reichenbach was asked by the Vossische Zeitung—at that time
the most renowned German daily newspaper—to write a brief account of Einstein’s new theory. Taking
advantage of his insider knowledge, Reichenbach had, in fact, continued to work on Fernparallelismus.
On January 22, he submitted to the Zeitschrift für Physik an extended version of the fairly technical
manuscript that he had sent to Einstein in October (Reichenbach, 1929d). On the same day, he finished
a less technical paper for the Zeitschrift für Angewandte Chemie that was published at the beginning
of February (Reichenbach, 1929b). Moreover, Reichenbach was quick to put on paper a more popular
exposition of the theory that was published in the Vossische Zeitung on January 25 (Reichenbach, 1929c).
The Vossische Zeitung premised the article, claiming that it was meant to give the readers an account
of “Einstein’s new work [. . .]—if only to prevent the emergence of public misunderstanding about the
contents of the theory, which is above all of a purely factual interest” (Reichenbach, 1929c).
3.2 Reichenbach’s Article for the Vossische Zeitung
Reichenbach’s article does not seem, at first, particularly noticeable. With his usual clarity, he gave
an overview of the unified field theory program. “The aim of the new theory,” he wrote, “is not so
new at all—it has been pursued with great tenacity by a number of mathematicians and physicists for
10 years now” (Reichenbach, 1929c; tr. 1978, 1:261). The great achievement of relativity theory was
the combination of a series of physical facts about the gravitational field under a single law; yet, the
theory could not incorporate the electromagnetic field. “Thus, two vast bodies of laws stood at the
pinnacle of physics,” Einstein’s gravitational field equations and Maxwell’s electromagnetic field equations
(Reichenbach, 1929c; tr. 1978, 1:261). However, these two sets of equations had “nothing to do with
each other; the world of physics was divided into two kingdoms: one ruled by Einstein, and the other by
Maxwell” (Reichenbach, 1929c; tr. 1978, 1:261). As Reichenbach rightly noticed, “[t]he temptation to
attempt a supreme union was irresistible: however, nature proved to be more stubborn than had been
anticipated” (Reichenbach, 1929c; tr. 1978, 1:261).
Reichenbach introduced the readers of the Vossische Zeitung to Weyl’s (1918a) “initial attempt to
develop a unified field theory for gravitation and electricity”, by creating “the apparatus of which others
subsequently made use, including, finally, Einstein himself” (Reichenbach, 1929c; tr. 1978, 1:261). A series
of approaches were attempted along these lines, he continued, most notably by Eddington (1921). “Einstein
attempted out a number of theories, all tending in this same direction”, initially following Weyl–Eddington
line26 but without success (Reichenbach, 1929c; tr. 1978, 1:261). “But today,” Reichenbach went on,
“Einstein has taken a new step, deviating somewhat in its mathematical apparatus from his previous
accounts, and this time he is firmly convinced of its significance” (Reichenbach, 1929c; tr. 1978, 1:262).
As Reichenbach reported, the theory seems to have reached results that went beyond those of previous
unification attempts:
Indeed, the new theory succeeds in uniting the fundamental laws of relativity mechanics and the
fundamental laws of electricity into a single formula. As per this formula, there is only one substance,
the ‘field,’ and only one law of the universe; the field is composed of electrical and gravitational
components, and all these components are united under a single formula. Einstein was able to show
that the previously known laws can be derived from this formula such that it signifies the subordination
of the two formerly divided realms under a higher law. Yet, the new formula achieves still more; it
represents the older theory of two systems as a special case and makes new assertions concerning the
relation between gravitation and electricity in relatively complicated fields. Thus, the new theory is of
more than merely formal significance because it asserts the existence of an effect of gravitation upon
electrical events and vice versa. It is not yet possible to form a picture of how this connection will
work out in detail from a physical standpoint. In particular, it remains an open question whether
the new theory will enable scientists to solve the puzzle of quantum theory, which itself represents a
peculiar combination of mechanics and electricity theory (Reichenbach, 1929c; tr. 1978, 1:262; m.e.).
This seemingly descriptive passage contains a philosophically relevant point that is worth highlighting.
Reichenbach reported that the novelty of Fernparallelismus consisted in the fact that it no longer seeks
to establish a formal synthesis between already established theories; instead, it produces new laws, of
which gravitational and electromagnetic field equations are only a first approximation. For strong fields,
there would be a much closer interdependence between electromagnetism and gravitation. In principle,
the theory could receive experimental proof if the effects predicted did not remain beyond the threshold
of experimental detection. However, the problem of the constitution of matter or the quantum problem
26Reichenbach probably refers to Einstein (1923; 1923; 1923; 1925), in which Einstein explored different theories based on
non-Riemannian four-dimensional geometry. Reichenbach never mentions Einstein’s interest for Riemannian 5D theories
(Einstein, 1927Kaluza, 1921).
15
were far from being satisfactorly addressed. Thus, Reichenbach concluded that “for the time being, no
pronouncement can be made concerning the physical significance of the theory” (Reichenbach, 1929c; tr.
1978, 1:262).
Reichenbach was keen on emphasizing that the present situation “was different when the general
theory of relativity made its first public appearance” (Reichenbach, 1929c; tr. 1978, 1:262). Einstein’s
theory of gravitation was “worked out in all its consequences, which had already passed its first great
empirical test and therefore justly deserved widespread public interest” (Reichenbach, 1929c; tr. 1978,
1:262). However, “the latest extension of the theory is only a first draft, lacking the convincing power of
the original relativity theory because of the very formal method by which it is established” (Reichenbach,
1929c; tr. 1978, 1:262; m.e.). This criticism was not new, and Reichenbach had denounced the lack of
‘convincing power’ of the previous unified field theories as well.27 However, in this context, Reichenbach
wanted most of all to exert a calming influence on the public discussion. Surely, because “the hypothesis
is presented by a man of the experience and theoretical insight of Einstein, it must be taken completely
seriously as science” (Reichenbach, 1929c; tr. 1978, 1:262). However, until “the new theory has been
thoroughly worked over, no leads are available for the public discussion of this matter” (Reichenbach,
1929c; tr. 1978, 1:262).
3.3 Einstein’s Reaction and Reichenbach’s Reply
On the January 25, 1929, the very same day Reichenbach’s article was published, Einstein sent an angry
letter to the editorial office of the Vossische Zeitung: “I was surprised,” he wrote, “that your normally very
respectable newspaper has facilitated a colleague’s tactless behavior toward me” (Einstein to Vossische
Zeitung, Jan. 25, 1929; EA, 73-229). As Einstein recounted, “Dr. Reichenbach asked me for information
about my new work and I willingly provided him with the information he requested” (Einstein to Vossische
Zeitung, Jan. 25, 1929; EA, 73-229). However, Reichenbach, “[w]ithout waiting for the work to appear,
without asking me or even notifying me,” made this information public. According to Einstein, this
behavior “was absolutely contrary to academic mores” (Einstein to Vossische Zeitung, Jan. 25, 1929; EA,
73-229).
Einstein’s reaction caught the editors of the Vossische Zeitung by surprise. Montague ‘Monty’ Jacobs,
the responsible of the Feuilleton, that is, the cultural pages of the Vossische Zeitung. Jacobs apologized
and rushed to defend the newspaper’s behavior (Jacobs to Einstein, Jan. 26, 1929; CPAE, Vol. 16, Doc.
383). He forwarded a copy of Einstein’s letter to Reichenbach who was dumbfounded by the allegations.
As Reichenbach wrote to Jacobs on January 27, he was deeply upset by Einstein’s letter, especially “after
years of work for his theory and the recognition of his person” (Reichenbach to Jacobs, Jan. 21, 1929; EA,
20-098). On the same day, Reichenbach replied with a long and very forthright letter to Einstein himself:
Dear Mr. Einstein, [. . .]
I am deeply hurt by your behavior toward me. If you thought you ought to bring any reproach
against me, you should have obviously addressed me directly and not the Vossische Zeitung. The
responsibility for my article falls on me and not on the newspaper. I have deserved that much personal
respect—after all that I have done for the theory of relativity and the recognition of your personal
achievements in public—that you cannot simply bypass me. Nevertheless, I would like to reply to you
directly because I cannot accept that you will insert a third party between us.
When I recently came to you so that you could tell me something about your new theory, I did really
come out of scientific interest—you can believe me. In the next few days, I received some requests for
information based on the sensational press releases published up to then. After I received numerous
such inquiries, since, after all, I write a lot for the general public, I have written the requested articles.
The deciding factor was the hope that I could do you a service. I imagined that you must have not
liked the sensational presentation of the previous reports and that nothing would matter more to you
than to keep the public opinion from interfering in a matter that belongs to the experts. Let’s be
honest: if anyone was entitled to take a stand on a matter concerning relativity theory—which by
now has become a public concern—it was me; there is hardly anyone who has attempted as much to
gain the broadest public understanding of relativity theory as I have (Reichenbach to Einstein, Jan.
27, 1929; CPAE, Vol. 16, Doc. 384).
Reichenbach’s philosophy was strongly related to, if not, to a certain extent, parasitic on, Einstein’s
work in relativity. Reichenbach acted as (a) a popularizer of Einstein’s relativity theories, and (b) as
their defender against attacks and misunderstanding coming from experts and non-specialists alike (c) as
27See Reichenbach (1922, 367) and Reichenbach to Einstein, Mar. 16, 1926; CPAE, Vol. 15, Doc. 224; a similar expression
was used by Pauli (1921, 763) with reference to Weyl’s theory.
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a philosopher providing an epistemological analysis of Einstein’s theories. Because of his indefatigable
productions of essays in periodicals and newspapers, Reichenbach reached a vast readership and integrated
his low income as a non-tenured extraordinary professor. At the same time, he marked his academic
career by publishing numerous technical articles in academic journals and three monographs on relativity
(Reichenbach, 192019241928a). As his response to Einstein testifies, Reichenbach was completely aware of
his prominence within the ‘protective belt’ that was erected around Einstein (Hentschel, 1990ab), a position
that had defined his role as public intellectual.28 However, most of all, his detailed, technical analysis of
Einstein’s theories had defined his profile as academic intellectual with respect to both traditional German
philosophy and, increasingly, with respect to the scientific philosophy as practiced by Schlick or Carnap.
Consequently, Einstein’s reaction was a ‘bitter blow’ for Reichenbach. As he rightly reported, his
article did not refer to any specific details of Einstein’s last paper (Einstein, 1929g), which indeed was not
feasible of being popularized. Thus, Reichenbach wondered whether Einstein was “hurt because I did
not support the new theory with the same warmth as I always defended the old one” (Reichenbach to
Einstein, Jan. 27, 1929; CPAE, Vol. 16, Doc. 384). However, Reichenbach had expressed caution toward
Einstein’s Fernparallelismus precisely to “rescue the theory from the press’ requirement for sensation”
(Reichenbach to Einstein, Jan. 27, 1929; CPAE, Vol. 16, Doc. 384). Reichenbach’s critical attitude toward
unified field theory program was not a well-maintained secret and should not have come as a surprise to
Einstein who was completely aware that their philosophical views had grown apart.
Ultimately, Reichenbach could not identify a reasonable justification for Einstein’s public accusations
and firmly reacted: “But you call my behavior tactless, and you even mention this to other people.
This—Mr. Einstein, I have not deserved this” (Reichenbach to Einstein, Jan. 27, 1929; CPAE, Vol. 16,
Doc. 384). Reichenbach’s role as Einstein’s public defender became an integral part of his intellectual
identity; however, it damaged his position within the academic philosophy (mostly dominated by Kantians)
because he could not obtain the position of full professor. “I have never blamed you in the slightest if,
despite everything, I never found your recognition and help for my work that I had hoped for” (Reichenbach
to Einstein, Jan. 27, 1929; CPAE, Vol. 16, Doc. 384). Reichenbach was, after all, aware that Einstein had
only a secondary interest in philosophical matters; however, Einstein’s recent behavior was too much to
bear: “But that you now want to shake me off in public as a ‘tactless colleague’ (without deigning me a
direct message) because I wrote a newspaper article that you do not approve—well, I will not put up with
that” (Reichenbach to Einstein, Jan. 27, 1929; CPAE, Vol. 16, Doc. 384). A few days later, Einstein—not
without somewhat enjoying the response he had elicited—explained to Reichenbach the motivations of
his forthright letter to the Vossische Zeitung (Einstein to Reichenbach, Jan. 30, 1929; CPAE, Vol. 16,
Doc. 390). Einstein felt besieged by the press and possibly anticipated an increase in unwanted attention
because of his fiftieth birthday in March. In this atmosphere, Einstein must have been annoyed that
even a colleague like Reichenbach contributed to the latest craze by leaking information to a newspaper
about a yet to be published scientific paper. Einstein concluded the letter with a note of reconciliation by
appealing to the natural weakness of all human beings (Einstein to Reichenbach, Jan. 30, 1929; CPAE, Vol.
16, Doc. 390). After Einstein’s explanation, Reichenbach, without stepping back, decided to deescalate
the conflict and to clarify his complaints about Einstein’s unappreciativeness:
Dear Mr. Einstein,
I see from your letter that my essay caused you some inconvenience. I really regret this from the
bottom of my heart, and you can believe me that I would not have written anything if I had the
slightest inkling of the situation you have just described to me. But I really could not have known
about the agreement that you had with the press, particularly because you did not give me the
slightest hint of secrecy.
I still have to get one thing right, though. In my letter, I did not hold you against ‘favors’ that I
would have done you because I have not ‘done you any favors.’ The last sentences in my letter should
only remind you that, because of the nature of my work, there was a relationship of trust between us,
which you seem to have forgotten, after you wrote directly to the Vossische Zeitung in this manner, by
bypassing me. If I may interpret your letter, and particularly your closing remarks, to mean that you
too now consider it more appropriate to resolve such issues directly between us, then perhaps I may
now consider the matter settled (Einstein to Reichenbach, Jan. 31, 1929; CPAE, Vol. 16, Doc. 391)
To some extent, this letter marks the end of an era in the history of the philosophy of space and time
(see Hentschel, 1990a, §3.4.3). Although Einstein and Reichenbach occasionally came in contact after
this abrupt worsening of their relationship, a nearly 10-year period of a lively exchange of ideas and
28Reichenbach’s role has been described in detail by Klaus Hentschel (1982). See also Hentschel, 1990a, §3.4.3. A recent
collection of Reichenbach’s less known essays of relativity has been aptly entitled Defending Einstein (Reichenbach, 2006).
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respectful feedback between a physicist and philosopher ended. After 1929, Reichenbach seems to have
lost interest in spacetime theories and primarily worked on the refinement of a theory of probability
(Reichenbach, 1935), its application to the general philosophy of science (Reichenbach, 1938) and to the
interpretation of quantum mechanics (Reichenbach, 1944). Indeed, one can surmise that Reichenbach might
have compounded what seemed like a minor quibble with a more profound philosophical estrangement.
Similar to Reichenbach’s private letters expressing Reichenbach’s woe for Einstein’s betrayal of their
personal relationship of trust, his published writings point to his disappointment for Einstein’s betrayal
of their shared philosophical ideals. Einstein was drifting away from the epistemological principles that
Reichenbach had found inspiring a decade earlier and for which he had fought for in both academic
and non-academic settings. In turn, Einstein felt that Reichenbach’s type of philosophy was ultimately
superficial and incapable of grasping the deeper-seated motivation that drove physicists’ research.
4 Geometrization vs. Unification. Reichenbach’s Technical Articles on Fernparallelismus-
Field Theory
The brief January 25 article in the Vossische Zeitung was not meant to adequately address the philosophical
issues at stake, but only to introduce the cultured layman to the ‘mysteries’ of contemporary physics.
However, it is revealing that Reichenbach did not present Einstein Fernparallelismus—as it would been
more natural in a popular writing—as an attempt of a geometrization of the electromagnetic field on
par with the previous geometrization gravitational field achieved by general relativity. On the contrary,
he decided to present Fernparallelismus in terms of an attempt of unification of two separate fields on
par with a similar unifications operated by special and general relativity. Reichenbach’s presentation
choice was, of course, not fortuitous. Indeed, the interplay between ‘geometrization’ and ‘unification’ was
addressed more in detail in the two technical papers on Fernparallelismus that Reichenbach had concluded
on the same days—both dated January 22, 1929 but published in the following months.
The first article of the order of publication was entitled “Die neue Theorie Einsteins über die Ver-
schmelzung von Gravitation und Elektrizität” (Reichenbach, 1929b) and would appear in February in
the Zeitschrift für Angewandte Chemie. The second article was an extended version of the manuscript
that Reichenbach had sent to Einstein in October and bore the same title “Zur Einordnung des neuen
Einsteinschen Ansatzes über Gravitation und Elektrizität” (Reichenbach, 1929d). It was published only in
September in the Zeitschrift für Physik. These articles represent Reichenbach’s last important contribution
to issues related to relativity theory and spacetime theories. On the one hand, Reichenbach attempted to
make his previous reflections about the unified field theory program in the Appendix to the Philosophie
der Raum-Zeit-Lehre to bear fruit (Reichenbach, 1928a, §46). On the other hand, he added new elements
of clarification by clearly distinguishing the ‘geometrization program’ and the ‘unification program.’
4.1 From Geometrization to Unification
In the first paper for the Zeitschrift für Angewandte Chemie, Reichenbach introduced the history of the
unified field theory in an entirely different manner than before. The brief history of the unified field theory
program appeared to him as the progressive downfall of the geometrization program and the concurrent
rise of the unification one. The considerable success that Einstein had attained with his geometrical
interpretation of gravitation, Reichenbach explained, initially led other physicists to believe that similar
success might be obtained from a geometrical interpretation of electromagnetism. With ten coefficients gµν
in Riemannian geometry, “the supply of elements [Bestimmungsstücken] was exhausted, and consequently
there were no more geometric quantities available that could have been used to characterize the electric
field” (Reichenbach, 1929b, 122).
It was Weyl who suggested considering a more general geometrical framework. By weakening the
compatibility conditions between the Γτµν and gµν , Weyl introduced, in addition to the tensor gµν , a
four-vector ϕµ of equally fundamental standing.29 In this manner, he opened “up the possibility of using
those other geometrical elements [Bestimmungsstücke] to characterize the electric field, i.e., to identify
certain geometrical parameters apt for characterizing the fundamental electric quantities—i.e., the electric
potentials ϕµ, whose derivation determine the field strengths” (Reichenbach, 1929b, 122). Thus, similar
to “in the gravitational field gµν is the determination factor of the length [of a vector] at one point, and
the electric field ϕµ is the determination factor of the change of length by transportation” (Reichenbach,
1929b, 122).
In analogy with general relativity, Weyl introduced what, in Reichenbach’s parlance, amounts to a
29See above fn. 21. ϕµ corresponds to κσ .
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coordinative definition of the operation of displacement of vectors. In Weyl’s geometry, spacetime lengths
of vectors at the same point in different directions can be compared, but the length of vectors at distant
points is path-dependent. It was then natural to assume that the length of vectors could be measured by
rods and clocks. Consequently, “one would surmise an influence of the electric field on transported rods
and clocks ” (Reichenbach, 1929b, 122). However, as it turns out, rods and clocks under the influence of
the electromagnetic field does not behave as predicted by Weyl’s theory. This argument is the gist of
Einstein’s so-called ‘measuring rod objection.’ The fact that the atoms that we use as clocks have sharp
spectral lines, Einstein (1918) argued, disproves Weyl’s theory (see Ryckman, 2005, §4.2.4).
According to Reichenbach, Weyl (1920), rather than abandoning the theory, decided to simply forego
such a coordinative definition of the process of displacement in terms of rods-and-clocks readings. The
selection of Weyl geometry rather than Riemannian geometry would be justified only after the field
equations are established, usually by way of an action principle (Weyl, 1921ab). From the latter, one
should have been able to deduce the behavior of the material structures that one uses as rods and clocks,
which, however, would have nothing to do with the law of parallel transport of vectors that lies at the
basis of the theory. In a somewhat disguised form, Weyl’s strategy was ultimately adopted by physicists
working on the unified field theory program (Eddington, 19211923). In this manner, however, Reichenbach
concluded, the ‘geometrization program’ was implicitly abandoned and substituted by a new, different
‘unification program’:
However, mathematicians did not give up on the new idea. If a direct physical interpretation of
Weylean space was impossible, they attempted an indirect approach. They considered Weyl’s space as
a type a mathematical apparatus that provided the means for novel mathematical operations and,
therefore, at least formally, opened the possibility for a unification of the electrical and gravitational
equations. The actual geometrical sense of Weyl’s approach was therefore completely abandoned,
and the extended type of space was only used, so to speak, in the sense of a calculating machine,
from whose internal lawlikeness one expected the solution of a riddle, which has been impossible to
master with direct, intuitive thinking. [. . .] In fact, it has already happened several times that the
human-made ‘conceptual device’ becomes, so to speak, smarter than its creator, leading automatically
to results that the more down-to-earth researchers would not have guessed. [. . .] Multiple influential
researchers have attempted to develop Weyl mathematics into a physical theory, in addition to Weyl,
the English astronomer Eddington, who significantly expanded the mathematical foundations, and
Einstein himself. (Reichenbach, 1929b, 122; m.e.).
Most physicists, including Einstein (1923; 1925) considered this strategy legitimate. It was preferable
to sacrifice the geometrical interpretation—i.e., to relinquish the coordination of geometrical notion of
parallel transport of vectors with the behavior rods and clocks—and then to use the geometrical variables
(Γτµν , ϕν and so on) as ‘calculation device’ for the greater good of finding the field equations. From the
field variables, one has to attempt to establish the simplest differential invariants that can be used as an
action function.
Einstein had convinced himself several times to have found the solution to the conundrum; however,
he changed his mind shortly after. “The last stage on this path is the new work that [Einstein] recently
presented to the Academy”30 (Reichenbach, 1929b, 123). Reichenbach gives a brief description of the
mathematical apparatus of Fernparallelismus but emphasized that this was not the crucial point. The
latter has become nothing more than a ‘calculation device.’ “The relevant issue,” he continued, “is that
from the equation that is placed at the top of the theory, one can derive both the gravitation equations
of today relativity theory and Maxwell’s equations” (Reichenbach, 1929b, 123; m.e.).31 Reichenbach
characterized the results that the Fernparallelismus theory aimed to achieve as follows:
– The field variables do not receive a geometrical interpretation. Rather, “Einstein was guided” by
abstract mathematical considerations “about invariants in Weylean space32 and the possibilities of
deriving equations from them” (Reichenbach, 1929b, 123). Therefore, the new theory has a “very
formal character” (Reichenbach, 1929b, 123). The success was obtained, so to speak, by placing
the cart before the horses, i.e., by selecting a geometrical structure such that it would lead to a set
of field equations of which the already known electromagnetic and gravitational field equations as
special cases for weak fields.
– Electromagnetic field and gravitational field are unified. “The formal aim of merging both systems
30Reichenbach refers to Einstein (1929g).
31Actually, Einstein recovered Maxwell’s equation and Newton–Poisson equations; see Einstein (1929g, 6-7).
32Reichenbach uses the expression ‘Weylean space’ to indicate the non-Riemannian geometries that can be obtained by
weakening or cutting the compatibility condition between the metric and the affine connection. ‘Weyl geometry’ is only an
example of this more general category.
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of equations into one has thus been achieved” (Reichenbach, 1929b, 123). However, a similar
juxtaposition of the two fields had already been achieved by previous theories. Thus, Reichenbach
insisted that Fernparallelismus appears as both a formally satisfying unification and a real step
forward beyond previous unification attempts. According to Reichenbach, “the most important thing
is that a certain concatenation of both systems of equations occurs in such a manner that a physical
dependence between electricity and gravity is asserted” (Reichenbach, 1929b). The distinction
between the electromagnetic and gravitational field occurs in the linear approximation. For strong
fields, this independence no longer holds, and electromagnetism induces a gravitational field and the
other way around. However, this dependence is weak, and the experimental confirmation of such
effects seems to be out of reach.
– The separation between the field equations and equations of motions is overcome. In a field theory,
usually there are two separate parts: (a) the partial differential equations relating the field to
its sources—the so-called field equations (b) the total differential equations governing the motion
(positive and negative) electrons—the so-called equation of motion. For a long time, Reichenbach
writes, Einstein “has pursued the goal of proving this law [of motion] as a mathematical consequence
from the field equations” (Reichenbach, 1929b, 123) but has managed to do so only of singularities
(Einstein, 1928bEinstein and Grommer, 1927; see Lehmkuhl, 2017a). The new theory seems to have
given him the opportunity to derive the behavior of elementary particles, even if “for the time being
[Einstein] cannot state how this is to be mathematically performed” (Reichenbach, 1929b, 123).
This method could have led to a unification of the foundations in that it would have made special
equations of motion for electrons superfluous. From this point of view, a moving electron would be
nothing but a field of changing intensity.
Thus, Reichenbach concluded that, along with the Fernparallelismus-field theory, the proper geometrical
interpretation of the field has become irrelevant. The only aim has become the proper unification of two
fields and possibly of field and matter: (I) the electromagnetic and gravitational field should become only
one total field; (II) the very difference between the matter and field should disappear. The attainment of
(I) seems to be necessary to explain elementary particles’ stability and accomplish (II). In turn (II) is the
only warranty that (I) has been achieved.
The proof that the field equations are correct ultimately depends on whether they have singularity-
free solutions corresponding to elementary particles that behave in accordance with our experimental
knowledge. Of course, this result has not been achieved, as Reichenbach remarked with a thinly veiled
skepticism. Thus, he again concluded the brief paper with an argumentum ad verecundiam: “The strongest
argument that one can presently provide for the new theory is that Einstein is convinced of its importance”
(Reichenbach, 1929b, 123). It is hard to deny that this sounds like a backhanded compliment. A theory
whose only motivation is the importance of the physicist who put it forward does not seem very promising.
4.2 The Duality of Unifications
Reichenbach had come to understand that, in Einstein’s view, the aim of the unified field theory program
was not the geometrization of the electromagnetic field alongside the gravitational field; it was the
unification of the electromagnetic and gravitational field. Thus, Reichenbach’s concern became to explain
what ‘unification’ means in this context. The problem was addressed in detail in the more technical paper,
which grew out of the manuscript that Reichenbach had sent to Einstein (Reichenbach, 1929d), which was
submitted on January 22 bearing the same title “Zur Einordnung des neuen Einsteinschen Ansatzes über
Gravitation und Elektrizität” as the manuscript (Reichenbach, 1928b). As we have mentioned, the first
part of the paper reproduces the manuscript he sent to Einstein, with minor changes. Reichenbach did
not consider Einstein’s objection discussed above (see section 2.3), and reproduced the same classification
of geometries that was presented in the manuscript. The last part of the article was instead substantially
reworked and integrated with some reflections about the concept of unification in physics. Similar
considerations can be observed in the chapter on the epistemology of physics that Reichenbach had written
for Handbuch der Physik, which had just been published (Reichenbach, 1929a).33 From a technical point
of view, the concepts of unification applied to a field theory is varied. One can, for example, look at
the properties of the field structure itself, or at the property that the field equations (Lehmkuhl, 2021).
However, Reichenbach attempted to provide a more general ‘epistemological’ definition of unification.
As Reichenbach put it, the goal of physics is to gain true propositions about reality. However, we
should distinguish between the breadth (the number of true assertions) and the depth of knowledge (the
combination of a number of propositions into a single proposition) (Reichenbach, 1929a, 36; tr. 1978,
33Reichenbach wrote it some years before, probably in 1925, see HR, 044-06-25.
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1:165). The increase of the breadth might be called the acquisition of knowledge, whereas the increase in
the depth of knowledge is called explanation. The acquisition of new facts, an increase in the direction of
breadth, does not explain, but rather requires explanation; an increase in explanation is a progressive step
of knowledge in the direction of depth (Reichenbach, 1929a, 36; tr. 1978, 1:165). Physical explanation
searches for the most general laws of physics from which all others can be derived (Reichenbach, 1929a,
36; tr. 1978, 1:165-166). In his paper, on Fernparallelismus Reichenbach slightly adapt this reasoning by
distinguishing two types of unification34:
(a) formal unification: the new theory does not claim more than the available theories combined. This
type of unification plays only a minor role in physics. Formal simplification is only of secondary
importance in increasing knowledge, although it can be useful to make a theory logically more
transparent or introduces a powerful mathematical formalism (Reichenbach, 1929a, 37; tr. 1978,
1:166). E.g., the four-dimensional geometry introduced into relativity theory by Minkowski (1909)
can be seen as merely a reformulation of Einstein’s (1905) special relativity using a more sophisticated
mathematical apparatus. The unification of this type applies to cases in which the physical theories
compared are empirically equivalent, i.e., correspond in all observable facts. Minkowski’s formulation
of special relativity is simpler than Einstein’s original one, but this is merely a matter of descriptive
simplicity, which adds nothing to its truth.
(b) inductive unification: the new theory claims more than the available theories combined. This form
of unification is more important in physics’ practice. The progress of physical knowledge comprises
establishing a more general law, for which the previous laws are special cases. For example, Newton’s
laws of gravitation is a special case of general relativity for the limit of slow motions and slowly
changing gravitational fields. Indeed, already to the first order approximation, general relativity
predicted new effects that were not entailed in Newton’s theory, like the ‘anomalous’ precession of
the perihelion of Mercury, the bending of light in gravitational fields, and the gravitational redshift.
In this case, unification power determines a choice between two empirically nonequivalent theories.
The two theories correspond to the observed measurements, but they differ as to future predictions
(Reichenbach, 1929a, 37; tr. 1978, 1:166).
This distinction between two types of unification mimics Reichenbach’s more famous distinction between
two types of simplicity (Reichenbach, 1924, 91929a, §11). The former is an application of the latter to the
case of unified field theories.
As we have seen, Reichenbach had shown that Fernparallelismus was, after all, not a new geometrical
setting, but it was already implicit in Weyl–Eddington–Schouten–Reichenbach’s classification of geometries.
Einstein’s Fernparallelismus geometry went first unnoticed, and, Reichenbach insisted, that other options
have not been taken into consideration (Reichenbach, 1929d, 687). In this way, Reichenbach’s new
Fernparallelismus approach became directly comparable to previous unifications. In particular, Reichenbach
could suggest a comparison between Einstein Fernparallelismus-field theory and his unified theory published
as §49 of the Appendix to the Philosophie der Raum-Zeit-Lehre (Reichenbach, 1928a, §49). The two
theories were, after all, similar from a geometrical point of view. Both used a metrical space endowed
with a non-symmetric affine connection. Einstein’s theory imposed the additional restriction of the
vanishing Riemann tensor. Moreover, in Reichenbach’s view, it could be said that both theories achieved
a unification of electromagnetic and geometrical field.35 Nevertheless, the two theories were significantly
different from an epistemological point of view.
According to Reichenbach, his §49-theory was able to provide a proper geometrical interpretation
of the combined gravitational/electromagnetic field. However, the theory could achieve only a formal
unification (a) because no new testable predictions were made:
The author [Reichenbach] has shown that the first approach can be realized in the sense of a
combination of gravitation and electricity to one field, which determines the geometry of an extended
Riemannian space; it is remarkable that the operation of displacement receives an immediate geometrical
interpretation via the law of motion of electrically charged mass points. The straightest line is identified
with the path of electrically charged mass points, whereas the shortest line remains that of uncharged
mass points. In this way, one achieves a certain parallelism to Einstein’s equivalence principle. By the
34Reichenbach suggests that the example of axiomatization in mathematics can help to clarify this distinction. I will not
follow this analogy here; see (Reichenbach, 1929a, 36; tr. 1978, 1:165-166) for more details.
35The two unifications were achieved by very different means. Reichenbach’s theory modified only the equations of motion,
whereas Einstein’s theory introduced a new set of field equations. For Einstein’s standards, Reichenbach’s theory could not
be considered a unified field theory in the proper sense of the expression (Einstein to Reichenbach, Mar. 31, 26; CPAE, Vol.
15, Doc. 402). However, Reichenbach remained silent about this issue.
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way [the theory introduces] a space which is cognate to the one used by Einstein, i.e., a metrical space
with non-symmetrical Γτµν . The aim was to show that the geometrical interpretation of electricity
does not mean a physical value of knowledge per se (Reichenbach, 1929d, 688; m.e.).
Reichenbach insisted that his theory was a proper geometrical interpretation because both the affine
connection and the metric (the fundamental mathematical structures of the theory) received a physical
interpretation from the outset (Reichenbach to Stoltz, Jun. 13, 1929; HR, 014-17-18). Nevertheless, the
theory achieved only formal unification of the descriptions of two physical fields in a common geometrical
setting without adding anything new, i.e., without making new predictions about the behavior of rods and
clocks, light rays, and test particles. Reichenbach’s theory was precisely meant to show that a successful
geometrical interpretation alone is not sufficient to achieve a substantive unification. For Reichenbach,
this should have been a warning that the very hope that the geometrical interpretation of a physical field
itself was the key to new physical insights was misplaced.
However, Reichenbach reported that physicists reacted to the failure of their geometrization program
by completely foregoing to the geometrical interpretation of gµν , the Γτµν , ϕµ as the case may be, and
used them merely as calculation tools to construct a suitable Lagrangian. Following this non-geometrical
approach, they aimed to recover the already known gravitational and electromagnetic field equations in
first order approximation such that new effects could be predicted in the presence of strong fields. Einstein
Fernparallelismus-field theory is an instance of this second approach, which claims to achieve (b), an
inductive unification, by renouncing to the geometrical interpretation:
However, Einstein’s approach, of course, uses the second way since it is a matter of increasing physical
knowledge; it is the aim of Einstein’s new theory to find such a concatenation of gravitation and
electricity, that only in first approximation it is split in the different equations of the present theory,
while is in higher approximation reveals a reciprocal influence of both fields, which could possibly
lead to the understanding of unsolved questions, like the quantum puzzle. However, it seems that this
aim can be achieved only if one dispenses with an immediate interpretation of the displacement, and
even of the field quantities themselves. From a geometrical point of view, this approach looks very
unsatisfying. Its justification lies only on the fact that the above-mentioned concatenation indicates
more physical facts than those that were required to establish it (Reichenbach, 1929d, 688; m.e.).
Einstein’s theory claimed to be an inductive unification of the dynamics of two physical fields, i.e., a
unification of the fundamental interactions described by a single, non-decomposable set of field equations.
In Reichenbach’s view, Fernparallelismus appeared not only as a formally satisfying unification but as
a real advance over the available theories. It entails some coupling between the two fields that was not
present in the given individual field theories. However, Reichenbach argues that Einstein could only
achieve this result at the expense of a physical interpretation of the fundamental geometrical variables, the
hνa. This approach, however, made the theory impossible to be confirmed or disproved experimentally by
observing the behavior of suitable indicators. Indeed, Einstein had always insisted that the physical test
of the field equations ultimately depends on the construction of exact solutions that reflect the behavior
of known elementary particles (Einstein, 1930b, 24). One cannot define the field quantities in advance
in terms of the behavior of test particles, as in other field theories. The laws governing the latter are
unknown before integrating the field equations (Einstein to Cartan, Jan. 7, 1930; Debever, 1979, A-XVI).
4.3 Explaining the Success of General Relativity
In Reichenbach’s diagnoses, the stagnation of the unified field theory program depended on the presence
of a sort of trade-off between geometrization and unification of which physicists were only partially
aware. General relativity was the only theory that was able to combine both virtues: (a) the theory
provided a proper geometrical interpretation of the gravitational field because it introduced a coordinative
definition of the field variables gµν , in terms of the behavior of those that were traditionally considered
geometrical measuring instruments, such as rods and clocks (b) the theory provided a proper unification
by predicting that the gravitational field had certain effects on such measuring instruments that were
not implied by previous theories of gravitation—such as gravitational time dilation (Reichenbach, 1928a,
350). Successive attempts to include the electromagnetic field in the frame of general relativity failed
to uphold this standard. According to Reichenbach, the reason for this failure was ultimately the lack
of a proper analogon of a physical fact that plays the role of the equivalence principle.36 As is well
known, the empirical fact of the equality of inertial and gravitational mass implies that free-fall is locally
36Reichenbach (misleadingly) indeed claims that in his theory there is something comparable to the equivalence principle.
However, he reports that this analogon is simply a reformulation of the well-known effects of the electromagnetic field on
charge test particles and does allow to make any new predictions. See Giovanelli, 2021 for more details.
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indistinguishable from inertial motion. The equivalence principle is the physical hypothesis that this
indistinguishability can be extended to all non-mechanical phenomena (Reichenbach, 1928a, 264; tr. 229f.).
Because of the equivalence principle, gravitation is a universal force that cannot be neutralized or shielded.
Thus, there is no way to separate the geometrical measuring instruments that are not affected by the field
(rods and clocks, light rays, force-free particles) from the dynamical ones that react to the field (charged
particles). Consequently, it becomes more convenient to decide to set universal forces equal to zero. The
geometrical measuring instruments became at once indicators of the gravitational field.
Because of the equivalence principle in the presence of the sole gravitational field, rods and clocks,
light rays, on the one hand, and particles (like planets), on the other hand, agree on the same geometry, a
generally non-flat-Riemannian geometry. Such a geometrical interpretation accounts for old inconsistencies
in Newton’s theory concerning the irregularities of Mercury’s orbit motion and allows for new predictions
like a more pronounced deflection of light by the Sun. Measurements carried out with real physical systems,
rods and clocks, light rays, free-falling particles, etc., seem to have confirmed the theory’s predictions.
Thus, in the case of general relativity, the geometrical interpretation had indeed been instrumental in
achieving an inductive unification, providing a smooth interpolation within a domain of observations.
However, the effective interplay between geometrization and unification did not seem reproducible without
the equivalence principle. Thus, to replicate the success of general relativity, physicists were forced to
make a choice. Two strategies seem to have been available, which ultimately depended on physicists’
interpretation of Einstein’s theory of gravitation:
(a) geometrization strategy: general relativity was a successful theory because it had provided a geomet-
rical interpretation of the gravitational field; then, one could hope to obtain the same success by
geometrizing the electromagnetic field as well. Still, if one attempts to provide a similar geometrical
interpretation of electromagnetism, one must search for a similar physical fact that relates the
electrical field to the behavior of geometrical measuring instruments, like rods and clocks. However,
the fundamental fact that would correspond to the principle of equivalence is lacking.
(b) unification strategy: general relativity was a successful theory because it had achieved the unification
of two different fields, gravitational and inertial field. In this way, however, the gravitational/inertial
field was provisionally isolated from a more general field of unknown mathematical structure,
encoding quantities corresponding to the electromagnetic field. The search for this mathematical
structure was worth pursuing, but its geometrical interpretation was immaterial. However, without a
physical fact corresponding to the equivalence principle, one does not know what such a mathematical
structure might be, if it exists at all.
Like many others, Reichenbach believed that without a new physical hypothesis—that is a physical fact
that played the role of the strict equality of inertial and gravitational mass—, both strategies, (a) and (b)
had little hope of success.
However, in Reichenbach’s reconstruction, after Weyl’s failure of pursuing (a), most physicists, and in
particular Einstein, opted for (b). Einstein seemed to believe that (b) could be justified based on a different
ground, assuming that nature satisfies the simplest imaginable mathematical laws. This assumption was
the new physical hypothesis on which the strategy (b) could be based (see Reichenbach, 1928a, §50). One
searches for the most natural field structure, and the simplest field equations that such structure satisfies.
After all, Einstein could claim, this is how physics has always been done: Maxwell’s equations are nothing
but the simplest laws for antisymmetric tensor field Fµν which is derived from a vector field; Einstein’s
equations were the simplest generally covariant laws that govern a Riemannian metric gµν and so on. The
only warranty of the success of this speculative groping in the chaos of mathematical possibilities was
the unification power of the field equations obtained. The latter should have predicted some unknown
coupling between the electromagnetic field and the gravitational field, which ultimately would have served
as the basis of a theory of matter. This was indeed the case of the Fernparallelismus-field theory.
To Reichenbach’s dismay, Einstein had abandoned the physical heuristic that leads him to general
relativity in the name of a mathematical heuristic that was not different from Weyl’s speculative approach
that he had dismissed a decade earlier.37 Einstein’s philosophical volte-face might have appeared to
Reichenbach as a sort of trahison des clercs, an unacceptable intellectual compromise. (a) The core of
Reichenbach’s philosophy was the separation of mathematical necessity and physical reality. Reichenbach
had always perceived this separation as nothing more than a philosophical distillation of Einstein’s scientific
practice. (b) In the search of a unified field theory, Einstein had come implicitly to question this very
37See Weyl to Einstein, May 18, 23; CPAE, Vol. 13, Doc. 30 and Weyl to Seelig, May 19, 1952, cit. in Seelig, 1960, 274f..
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distinction, ultimately pleading for a reduction of physical reality to mathematical necessity38 . Einstein
put it bluntly in his Stodola-Festschrift’s contribution—that he sent for publication toward the end of
January (Einstein to Honegger, Jan. 30, 1929; CPAE, abs. 864). The ultimate goal of understanding
reality is achieved when one could prove that “even God could not have established these connections
otherwise than they actually are, just as little as it would have been in his power to make the number 4
a prime number” (Einstein, 1929f, 127). In this sense, Einstein’s God indeed resembles Spinoza’s God
(Einstein, 1929b), for whom the laws of nature are necessary, and rather than, say, Leibniz’s God for
whom the laws of nature are contingent.
Conclusion
On January 30, 1929, Einstein’s rumored new derivation of the Fernparallelismus-field equations was
published in the Proceedings of the Berlin Academy with the ambitious tile Zur einheitlichen Feldtheorie
(Einstein, 1929g). Despite his anger toward Reichenbach’s ‘leaks,’ Einstein did not hesitate to feed the
hopes of the general public by popularizing his new theory in the daily press. On February 2, 1929, in
its section “News and Views” (1929), Nature reported an interview of Einstein published in the Daily
Chronicle, on January 26, 1929, a day after the publication of Reichenbach’s infamous article in the
Vossische Zeitung. Einstein’s quarrel with Reichenbach had deeper philosophical roots that went way
beyond questions of academic etiquette. A few days later, Einstein wrote a popular account of the
new theory (Einstein, 1929a). Its English translation was published on the first page of their Sunday
supplement of the New York Times on February 3 and in The Times of London in two installments on
February 4 and 5 (Einstein, 1929ce; also published as Einstein, 1930a).
Einstein insisted on “the degree of formal speculation, the slender empirical basis, the boldness in
theoretical construction, and finally the fundamental reliance on the uniformity of the secrets of natural
law and their accessibility to the speculative intellect” (Einstein, 1930a, 114). This “speculative method”,
Einstein claimed, was the same that lead to to success of general relativity: “Which are the simplest
formal structures that can be attributed to a four-dimensional continuum, and which are the simplest
laws that may be conceived to govern these structures?” (Einstein, 1930a, 115). In trying to defend
this epistemological stance, Einstein was not afraid to side with “Meyerson in his brilliant studies on the
theory of knowledge” who had emphasized the ‘Hegelian’ nature of such enterprise, “without thereby
implying the censure which a physicist would read into this” (Einstein, 1930a, 115).
The fact the Einstein chose to mention Meyerson rather than Reichenbach as a philosophical reference
in a popular presentation of his last theory for a major newspaper cannot be underestimated. Of course,
Einstein was well aware of Reichenbach’s technically informed work on this very subject, having discussed
it with him in the previous months. Nevertheless, as he did in the contribution for the Stodola-Festschrift
(see above section 2.3), Einstein preferred to side with Meyerson’s less detailed, but, in his view, a
more profound philosophical outlook—endorsing even his somewhat outrageous comparison with Hegel
(Giovanelli, 2018). After a decade of personal friendship and intellectual exchange that had shaped the
history of 20th-century philosophy of science and, to a certain extent of 20th-century physics, a minor
squabble had unwittingly revealed a nearly unbridgeable philosophical divide.
Reichenbach invited Einstein to contribute to the newly founded journal Erkenntnis published by Felix
Meiner and edited with Carnap (Reichenbach to Einstein, Apr. 25, 1930; EA, 73-226). However, to no
avail. Nevertheless, when Hugo Dingler (1933), a few years later, launched a political attack against the
journal, he mocked Reichenbach as “Einstein’s self-proclaimed personal philosopher [Leibphilosoph]” who
replaced logic with the authority of a great physicist (Dingler, 1933, VI). As we have seen, besides the
deterioration of their personal relationship, Einstein’s extreme rationalism in those years (Einstein, 1933a)
could not be more distant from Reichenbach’s inductivism (Reichenbach, 1931; see Galavotti, 2009). But
Dingler did not mean to open a scholarly dispute (Howard, 2003). Reichenbach replied from his Turkish
exile, insisting on the political independence of journal (Reichenbach, 1934). However, the situation
rapidly deteriorated, and the seventh volume of Erkenntnis (1937-1938) was edited by Carnap alone.
Reichenbach’s initial enthusiasm for Turkey soon waned and he tried to obtain a position in Princeton,
where Einstein had settled in 1933 (Verhaegh, 2020). However, Reichenbach feared Weyl’s opposition: “He
is my adversary since a long time,” he wrote to the American philosopher Charles W. Morris, a supporter
38Already in his habilitation, Reichenbach, although rather in passing, accused Weyl of attempting to deduce physics from
geometry, by reducing physical reality to ‘geometrical necessity’ (Reichenbach, 1920, 73). However, the greatest achievement
of general relativity, Reichenbach claimed, was to have shifted the question of the truth of geometry from mathematics to
physics (Reichenbach, 1920, 73). Einstein was now committing the very same “old mistake” again (Reichenbach, 1920, 73).
On Reichenbach’s habilitation, see Padovani (2009).
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of a form a “mathematical mysticism” that was “very much opposed to my empiricistic interpretation
of relativity” (Reichenbach to Morris, Apr. 12, 1936; HR, 013-50-78). Thus, in April 1936, Reichenbach
turned to Einstein to ask his support: “I surmise that Weyl’s opposition persists to these days and
therefore I’d be grateful if you could put a word in my favor” (Einstein to Reichenbach, May 2, 1936;
EA, 20-118). By this time, it was ironically Einstein the one indulging in the sort of mathematical
mysticism that Reichenbach attributed to Weyl. As Einstein famously confessed to Lanczos, his work on
general relativity had made him “a believing rationalist” (Einstein to Lanczos, Jan. 24, 1938; EA, 15-268),
convinced that physical truth lies in mathematical simplicity (Ryckman, 2014). However, he continued,
the mathematical formulation of the laws of nature need not to be of “geometrical nature” (Einstein to
Lanczos, Jan. 24, 1938; EA, 15-268).
Only in 1938, because of Morris’ mediation, Reichenbach managed to move to the United States
(Verhaegh, 2020). The American years did nothing to bridge the philosophical cleavage that had emerged
during their late Berlin time. Einstein (1949b; 1949c) praised Reichenbach’s (1949)’s contribution to the
volume in his honor of the series Library of Living Philosophers edited by Paul Schilpp (1949). However,
the self-described “tamed metaphysician” had grown increasingly impatient toward any philosophy that
smelled of ‘positivism’ (Einstein, 1950, 13). When in 1953 Schilpp asked Einstein for contributing to
the volume of the same series in honor of Carnap (Schilpp to Einstein, May 11, 1953; EA, 80-539), he
famously declined. After “Reichenbach’s death (a few weeks ago),”39 Schilpp wrote, Carnap was the most
important exponent of logical empiricism (Schilpp to Einstein, May 11, 1953; EA, 42-534). Although
Einstein agreed with this assessment, he expressed disenchantment toward that type of philosophy that
Schlick, Reichenbach, and Carnap represented: “the old positivistic horse, which originally appeared so
fresh and frisky, has become a pitiful skeleton” (Einstein to Schlipp, May 19, 1953; EA, 42-534; quot. and
tr. in Howard, 1990, 374)
When, in 1958, The Philosophy of Space and Time (Reichenbach, 1958), the English translation
of Philosophie der Raum-Zeit-Lehre (Reichenbach, 1928a), was published, and the Appendix on the
unified field theory program was not included. Reichenbach’s articulate critique of the unified field
theory program fell into oblivion at the very moment when a new geometrization/unification attempt
was emerging in the form of the so-called ‘geometrodynamics’ (Misner and Wheeler, 1957; see Stachel,
1974). Because Reichenbach’s The Philosophy of Space and Time for better or worse dictated the agenda
of the philosophy of space and time in the following decades (Grünbaum, 1963Fraassen, 1970Sklar, 1974)
this loss should not be underestimated. Certain key documents to understand Reichenbach’s role in
the major debates on relativity in the 1920s never received mainstream attention. The importance of
Reichenbach’s antagonism with Weyl was not appreciated (cf. Coffa, 1979), and most of all Reichenbach’s
relationship with Einstein was seriously misunderstood. When Nicholas Rescher (2006) celebrated the
enormous influence of Reichenbach’s school in the on American philosophy of science, opening the study,
he could simply define the Berlin group as a “philosophical movement that was erected on foundations laid
by Albert Einstein,” whom the members of the group considered a “hero among philosopher-scientists”
(Rescher, 2006). As this paper has tried to show, this assessment, at first sight was so obvious, that it
becomes surprisingly problematic without specifying which ‘Einstein’ they were worshiping. Reichenbach’s
‘Einstein’ was indeed not Weyl’s ‘Einstein’ (Ryckman, 1996). Furthermore, when Reichenbach moved
closed to his ‘hero’ in Berlin in the late 1920s, he soon realized, much to his dismay, that his ‘Einstein’
was considerably different from the one the real Einstein had become.
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